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ABSTRACT 
As a result of the widespread globalization, historically separated markets have merged into one global 
marketplace and consequently MNEs have been able to disperse their operations abroad. Over the past  
decades, there has been a shift in the FDI pattern as flows now originate from developing and emerging 
economies,  in particular  from China.  More recently the OFDI flows from China have not  only been 
targeted towards countries in the West but also into countries in Africa known for their natural resources 
endowments. Earlier research has retained its focus on an aggregated level. Therefore the purpose of this  
thesis  has  been  to  analyze  China’s  motives  behind  investments  in  African  firms  and  the  subsequent 
consequences considering the long-term impacts on economic development in receiving countries. This  
has been done by analyzing a number of selected case studies that illustrate Chinese OFDI in firms in 
South Africa, Nigeria and Angola. Our empirical findings have been analyzed utilizing Dunning’s eclectic 
paradigm (1980,  1988,  2000) extended with Rugman’s  FSA/CSA Matrix (1981, 2010)  and Mathews’ 
LLL-model (2006). We found that Chinese MNEs invest in African firms primarily for resource-seeking 
motives  and in  the  long-term Chinese OFDI provides  economic and social  development  in  receiving 
countries. Nevertheless, political and institutional aspects could increase the risk and impede potential  
economic development for the FDI receiving countries and its people. Hence, emphasizing the importance 
of a long-term strategy for global investment, not only for China as an investor, but for the receiving  
African country. 
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DEFINITIONS
Developed economy: there is no widely accepted definition, but in general it refers to highly developed 
countries according to some set of criteria i.e. GDP per capita, level of industrialization, living standard,  
infrastructure development.
Developing economy: economies where the majority live on less money than in the developed countries. 
Often rural economies with poor health and education systems, scarce infrastructure, water and power 
supplies, low government quality and small domestic markets. 
Emerging economy: an economy that is on the rise approaching advanced economies and have physical 
infrastructures such as banks, a stock exchange and a unified currency. 
Latecomers  and  newcomers:  economies  facing  accelerated  internationalization,  organizational 
innovation and strategic innovation, often leapfrogging stages in their internationalization process. 
Sino-African: term that aims to describe the relationship between China and Africa. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background 
Globalization could be referred to as the economies around the world becoming more integrated and  
interdependent as a result of technological advances and human innovation. Thus, historically separated 
markets  are  moving towards  a  global  marketplace,  which  has  increased  the movement  of  labor  and 
technology,  as  well  as  trade and financial  flows across  borders.  Since the 1980s,  when  globalization 
evolved as a common term, the striking increase of globalization has resulted in the value of goods and 
services growing from 42.1% to 62.1% in 2007 measured in world GDP (IMF, 2008). Furthermore, the  
growth in global markets has opened up the opportunities for multinational enterprises (MNEs) to disperse 
their operations in order to take advantage of factors of production such as capital, technology, labor and 
expertise in larger or more diversified markets. The globalization has led to a rapid increase in trade and  
production  through MNEs becoming more  internationalized  and as  a  result  the  global  foreign  direct 
investment (FDI) inflows have grown from 6.5% in 1980 to 31.8% in 2006 in terms of world GDP (ibid.).
Foreign investments refers to “[...] the transfer of tangible or intangible assets from one country into  
another for the purpose of their use in that country to generate wealth under the total or partial control of  
the owner of the assets” (Sornarajah, 2004:7). FDIs are investments undertaken by a company to take on a 
lasting interest  and a long-term relationship in other  enterprises  across  the borders of their  economy. 
Moreover,  the  direct  investor  seeks  to  acquire  a  large  degree  of influence  and  control  over  the 
management of the enterprise they intent to invest in, which is an important disparity in comparison to  
foreign portfolio investments. Hence in order to serve as a FDI investor, the minimum shares have to 
account  for  10% or  more  (UNCTAD,  2013a).  When  looking  further  into  FDI,  there  is  a  distinction 
between FDI flows and FDI stocks. The former refers to capital supplied by either a foreign direct investor 
to a company or capital obtained from an investing company by a foreign direct investor. Conversely, FDI 
stock includes the share value of the invested capital and reserves in the company (UNCTAD, 2007). 
Generally, since the late 1980s there has been a surge in FDI flows among industrialized economies where 
other developed countries have been the main recipients. Yet, over the past decades, governments have 
been more optimistic towards FDIs, liberalizing FDI regimes and policies in order to attract FDI. Thus this 
has led to a shift towards FDI flows into developing countries as well as emerging economies that have 
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primarily  seen  FDI as  a  source  generating  economic  growth  (OECD, 2002).  As  of  2009,  the  global  
economy faced a recession during the financial crisis which resulted in a fall in FDI flows worldwide.  
Still,  the developing countries and transition economies both accounted for almost half of global FDI  
inflows.  The  increase  of  FDI  from  developing  countries,  both  in  terms  of  inflows  and  outflows, 
contributed to a retrieval thus changing the global pattern of FDI (UNCTAD, 2010). This development is 
most remarkable in Asia, where China as the leading developing economy, measured in world GDP, has  
become one of the top recipients of FDI (Zhang & Daly, 2011).
Over nearly two decades, FDI flows towards China have greatly promoted growth and been important for 
the country, resulting in a shift away from severe poverty and under-development to becoming highly  
integrated into the world economy (Renard, 2011). But FDI has not always been permitted in China. At an 
initial point, FDI were concentrated in China’s Four Special Economic Zones involving a limited number  
of  sectors.  In  the  early  1980s  foreign  investment  laws  and preferential  policies  were  adopted  which 
resulted in a growth in China’s FDI inflows (Whalley, 2011). However, most importantly in this context, is 
the increase of outward FDI (OFDI) from emerging markets, a development that has risen sharply over the 
past years. As a result, the world has seen a steady increase of Chinese OFDI flows as China has become  
more integrated into the world economy (Zhang & Daly 2011). This is also a result of the nation’s great  
governmental current account surplus and international reserves (Ahuja et al., 2012; Forbes, 2014). 
When looking further into China’s OFDIs, they have historically been small in comparison to its inward  
FDI (Whalley,  2011).  In this context,  the Chinese government  has played an important  role,  shaping 
policies which have encouraged firms to go overseas and thus significantly increased China’s OFDI (Alon 
et al., 2012). China’s development of OFDI policies have gone through three important phases (Buckley et 
al., 2008; Luo et. al, 2010). During the initial phase (1979-1990) foreign investment laws and preferential 
policies were adopted by the Chinese government as a result of China’s “open door policy” in 1979, which 
led to the emergence of China’s OFDIs (Whalley, 2011). During the second phase in the early 1990s  
(1991-2000) China faced a significant growth in OFDI when policies were promoted for further openness  
as well as market-oriented reforms and tax preferences. In the third phase (2001-present) the Chinese 
government initiated the “going out policy” in 2000, which resulted in an enhanced OFDI strategy on a 
country  level,  lowering  protectionist  barriers,  which  fostered  China’s  competitive  advantage  and 
encouraged investors to invest overseas. Moreover China’s accession to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 2001 further promoted openness and less strict policies in order to achieve a business climate  
that facilitated OFDIs. This included, among other things, deregulations in investment approval as well as  
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in  foreign  exchange  control,  such  as  the  “Further  Measures  on  Foreign  Exchange  Administration 
Stimulating  OFDI  2005”.  The  state  also  supported  investments  with  financing  as  well  as  credit  and 
insurance  (Alon et  al.,  2012).  As  a  result  of  such  measures  undertaken by  the  Chinese  government, 
China’s OFDIs faced an exponential growth in the early 2000s as illustrated below (see figure 1). As a 
matter of fact, in 2012 China ranked the third largest investor in the world after the United States and 
Japan (UNCTAD, 2013b).
Figure 1. China’s outward FDI boom (PRC State Administration of Foreign Exchange, UNCTAD, Rhodium Group, 2012)
In the early 2000s the majority of China’s OFDIs were made in Asia, followed by Latin America and only 
2% were directed towards Europe and Africa (Whalley, 2011). Over the past years, however, China’s  
OFDIs  have  dispersed  to  other  destinations  targeting  developing  countries  ahead  of  industrialized 
countries, with a movement towards the African continent where China has become a leading FDI investor 
among developing countries (OECD, 2008). 
1.1.1 Chinese Investments in Africa 
China and Africa has a long history of trade relations. Already back in the post colonial period, Guinea,  
Ghana and Mali were closely politically related to China as a result of Chinese contributions including 
loans as well as economic and technical cooperation. Among these countries, Ghana was the first African 
nation to establish diplomatic relations with China. In the 1960s relations between China and Africa were  
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preserved as China offered a number of benefits.  Compared to Western countries, it was easier to get  
Chinese assistance  in  financing  as  well  as  services  that  aimed to enhance  technical  and  professional 
development of personnel. Furthermore the Chinese assistance was granted at very low prices and a long 
payback period. Until 1954 trade between China and Africa was marginal and it was not until  China  
opened up its economy in the late 1970s that its presence in Africa became more vigorous and the Sino-
African  trade  faced  a  significant  growth  (Renard,  2011).  African  nations  also  viewed  China  as  an 
alternative to the Soviet Union and the West, former colonial powers (Jauch 2011; Renard, 2011). As early 
as in 1956 China supplied with aid and its  engagement  in Africa  also involved military support  and 
investments in for example prestigious projects in infrastructure as well as as in hospitals and stadiums. 
Furthermore, as China implemented its “going out policy” its relations with countries in Africa became 
more crucial in order to secure supplies of resources such as energy and raw materials, with the aim to  
feed its rapid economic development (Renard, 2011).
Historically, Africa’s abundance of natural resources has attracted many Western countries to the continent  
for different purposes. In particular during the colonization era, Western people strived to obtain the well-
known reserves of natural resources found in the African continent (David, 2011). In modern times, the  
world has seen a tremendous rise in FDIs into Africa, which is expected to enhance economic growth and 
thereby reduce poverty in the continent (UNCTAD, 2005). In general, Africa as a receiver of global FDIs  
saw a steady increase measured by historical standards before the financial crisis in 2008. In comparison  
to the total FDIs of $16 billion USD in 2002, Africa as a continent received $87 billion USD in FDIs in 
2008 (Ford, 2011). The aftermath of the financial crisis caused FDIs into Africa to fall down to $55.9 
billion USD in 2009 followed by $50.1 billion USD in 2010, however the decline was not spread equally 
across the continent (ibid). 
As the FDI flows into Africa are increasing, the World Bank confirms that investors are starting to widen 
their  eyes,  not  only focusing  on the traditional  mining,  oil  and gas  sector,  but  other  sectors  such as  
agricultural,  banking,  tourism as  well  as  manufacturing  as  productivity  and growth  opportunities  are 
improving (UNCTAD, 2005). Even though the major part of FDI flows to Africa still derive from Europe 
and the United States, Asian investors and especially Chinese, are players with increasing importance 
(Ford,  2011),  where  China’s  main  interest  is  known  to  be  the  search  for  Africa’s  natural  resources 
endowments (Allen,  2014). As previously discussed,  the growth of China’s FDI into Africa has been 
linked with the increase in  Sino-African trade relations,  although when comparing with China’s  total 
OFDIs, the flows to Africa are relatively small. Yet, over the past decade, Chinese FDIs in Africa have  
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grown sharply by 46% according to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (Renard, 2011).
1.2 Problem Discussion
The fact that China’s presence in the world has developed over the past years is hardly news. However, in  
recent years attention has been drawn to the sharp rise in China’s OFDI, which has spurred discussions as 
there has been a movement of flows towards developing countries such as to the countries in Africa 
(Kolstad & Wiig, 2009). 
Our preliminary investigation on recent empirical studies and publications reveals that research primarily 
has been focusing on questions regarding motives, determinants and impacts of Chinese OFDIs in Africa.  
According to Buckley et al. (2007) one major force driving Chinese investments into Africa is, in general,  
the exploitation of natural resources endowments such as raw materials and energy to feed its domestic  
production. Africa has also been the destination for Chinese investments in the search for new, pertinent  
markets for Chinese low-cost manufacturing (Shinn & Eisenman 2012; Wang, 2007). Zhang and Daly 
(2011)  further  mention  other  motives  for  Chinese  firms  investing  overseas  such  as  the  call  to  gain 
management skills and advanced technology. 
Further,  our  preliminary  investigation  shows  that  Chinese  investments  are  associated  with  overseas 
markets with poor institutions and governance as well as high country risk. Nonetheless, this has raised 
concerns and criticism towards China that the country is exploiting natural resources and has constituted 
poor regimes in host countries (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009). China’s increasing OFDIs in Africa are especially  
criticized by Western countries claiming that the increased flows is a result of China’s strategic plans to  
obtain oil and other important raw material resources (Cheru & Obi, 2014). Although Chinese investments 
mainly have been associated with aid, debt relief, investments and preferential loans (Jauch 2011; Renard 
2011),  there  has  been  a  recent  debate  concerning  China’s  underlying  motives  behind  the  increased 
investments into Africa,  whether China’s  economic relationship with Africa promotes development or  
more likely, contributes to the development of neo-colonialism. Jauch (2011:51) claims in his article that: 
“There is a danger of the Africa-China economic relationship following the colonial pattern of relegating  
Africa to the role of a raw materials supplier” 
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Also the Chinese labor exploitations in Africa are addressed in his article, particularly regarding labor  
conditions at Chinese companies operating in Africa. Findings in a study that was put forth by African 
Labour Research Network (ALRN) 2008-2009 show how Chinese employers violate worker’s rights with 
insufficient working conditions and low wages in comparison to other employers within the same industry 
(Jauch, 2011).
In nearly two decades the economic growth in Africa has been observed, a continent whose development 
has gained considerable attention (e.g.  Arbache & Page,  2009;  Obel,  2013).  However,  we found that 
existing research on Chinese OFDI in Africa retains its focus on a more aggregated level (Alden, 2005;  
Kaplinsky & Morris,  2009,  Sanfilippo,  2010;  Wang  2007),  observing  Africa  as  a  whole,  rather  than 
deepening the perspectives by conducting further studies on a micro-level. Unlike other studies that have 
been made in the field of FDIs, our ambition is to fill these gaps by studying the investment flows in terms 
of motives and implications, which we believe would provide future researchers with new perspectives. 
1.3 Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze China’s motives behind investments in African firms and the 
subsequent  consequences  considering  the  long-term  impacts  on  economic  development  in  receiving 
countries. As previously discussed, the underlying motives behind Chinese OFDI into Africa have mainly 
been analyzed on an aggregated level and as far as we know, little attention has been drawn to research on  
a firm-level. Our aim is therefore to investigate Chinese OFDIs from a new perspective by analyzing a 
number  of  selected  case  studies  that  illustrate  Chinese investments  in  African  firms  and apply  these  
findings on our theoretical framework. Finally, the aim is to hopefully contribute to new findings and  
results within this field, whose importance has not been addressed so far as concerned. 
1.4 Research Question
By taking the above discussion into account, the following research question has been formulated:
What  are  the  motives  behind  Chinese  OFDI  into  African  firms  and  how  do  they  affect  economic  
development in receiving host countries in the long-term?
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For clarification, the motives will mainly be viewed from a Chinese point of view while the subsequent 
consequences will mainly be viewed from an African standpoint. 
1.5 Delimitations
In order to ensure a focused study with satisfactory results, a number of delimitations have been made 
throughout the process. First and foremost, the thesis will solely focus on Chinese OFDIs into Africa, 
referring to OFDI flows and not stocks. When FDI in terms of outflows is mentioned in this thesis we refer 
to China’s perspective whereas inflows naturally are regarded from Africa’s point of view. Further, we 
delimited  our  study  by  undertaking  a  firm-level  analysis,  looking  into  Chinese  investments  in  three 
countries in Africa; South Africa, Nigeria and Angola. 
Secondly,  we decided to conduct  our thesis focusing on case studies by looking further into Chinese  
investments in the aforementioned African countries. Since the flows vary by size and over time, the 
selection of  these countries  were based  on calculations  of  the highest  average  inflows of 18 African 
countries, which served as guidelines when we selected these countries (see figure 3. under section 4.1).  
However, the selection was also based on the access to relevant and sufficient data for each country,  
leading to the decision to not only base the choice on the highest average OFDI flows.
Finally, we encountered a number of limitations throughout the process. The time period that was studied 
in  this  thesis  is  dependent  on  available  data,  which  unfortunately  was  somewhat  difficult  to  access  
regarding the years after 2010. Therefore, the findings in this thesis will be presented based on data of  
Chinese OFDI that was found in the time period between 2004 and 2010, since the aim is to predicate the 
study on as accurate and updated data as possible. However the World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 
2006) shows that in 2005 global OFDIs faced a decline while those from China surged. Part of this growth 
could  be  explained  by  a  number  of  measures  and  regulations  that  were  undertaken  by  the  Chinese 
government in 2004 and 2005, which encouraged and considerably facilitated Chinese OFDI. Therefore 
we found this time range suitable as it captures the exponential growth in Chinese OFDI that occurred in  
the mid 2000s. 
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1.6 Disposition
This thesis is divided into six chapters. The introductory chapter presents a brief historical background in  
order to provide a better understanding of the chosen research area. The problem discussion emphasizes 
the importance of the chosen topic and highlights gaps in earlier research. This is followed by the purpose 
and the research  question  of  our  thesis.  Lastly,  it  describes  some delimitations  that  have  been  made  
throughout the process in order to ensure a focused study that provides satisfactory results. 
Methodology
The second chapter describes how the thesis has been conducted, as well as motivations for our selected  
research methods and approaches. More specifically, it describes how the empirical data was collected and  
analyzed. Lastly, this chapter discusses the credibility of the collected data to ensure a thesis with high 
quality. 
Theoretical Framework
The third chapter presents the theoretical framework and models that have been selected and utilized to  
provide proper explanations and analysis of our empirical findings. Based on our selected field of study,  
one fundamental theory is presented based as an extension of earlier theories, followed by criticism that  
has been addressed and complementary theories in order to provide a solid foundation and avoid a biased 
analysis. 
Empirical Findings
The  fourth  chapter  presents  the  empirical  findings  that  were  conducted  by  utilizing  secondary  data  
sources. It provides an overview of the African countries studied followed by three selected case studies 
with real life examples of Chinese MNEs investing in African-based firms. 
Analysis
The fifth chapter presents an analysis and discussion of the empirical  data  applied on the theoretical  
framework that  has  been  presented.  It  highlights  differences as  well  as  similarities  and discusses  the 
significance of the results. 
Conclusion
The sixth and last chapter presents a conclusion of the findings in the thesis and aims to fulfill the purpose 
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and answer the research question. It also provides suggestions for future research within the field of study. 
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2. METHODOLOGY
2.1 Research Design and Process 
Research  design  could  be  referred  to  as  the  “structure  of  an  enquiry”  (De  Vaus,  2001:16).  Before 
commencing a research process it is of high importance to first and foremost determine a research topic of 
interest and thereafter make a thorough plan of how the research should be conducted. This also includes 
the  selection  of  relevant  theoretical  framework,  as  well  as  accurate  research  methods  and modes  of 
available data collection given the research question (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). Before starting with  
our research process we investigated earlier research and theories and made a brief literature review in  
order to grasp the ongoing discussion and recent development within the chosen field of study. The initial  
research also revealed whether the chosen topic was researchable in accordance with available data and  
empirical findings (De Vaus, 2001; Flick, 2002). We discovered that the ongoing research was lacking in 
some perspectives, which engendered an idea of what we wanted to investigate further and helped us put  
forward our research question. 
When conducting a thesis it  is crucial to have knowledge about  methodology and how the choice of  
methods affect the results of the empirical findings in relevance to the research question that has been 
formulated. There are several methods that can be used in business research and one of these methods is  
the choice between exploratory, descriptive and causal research design. A descriptive research design is 
preferred when the research problem is clearly perceivable and focus is emphasized on the structure and  
procedures of conducting the study within a given and precise framework. The causal research design  
focuses on a rather structured problem but, on the other hand, it also addresses the emergence of potential 
causes and effects of the problem. Conversely, an exploratory research design is used when the problem is 
unstructured and less distinct. This implies a more flexible approach that allows new information to be 
gathered, which might result in new insights that change the strategy to find the solution to the problem.  
Since the problem of the latter type of research design is rather unstructured it requires skills of gathering 
and observing adequate data (Ghauri & Grönhaug, 2010). We argue that the selected research question in 
this thesis is of an exploratory kind as it focuses on description of the phenomenon followed by reasons 
and motivations of a behavior. Many times it digs deeper into the reasons and also answers questions as 
why the phenomenon exists and is the way it is (Donley, 2012). Thus, this research method was useful in 
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the thesis as the purpose was to gain new insight and fill the gap of a rather unexplored field. The most 
common tools to use in an exploratory research is secondary data analysis, which will be explained more 
in detail below (Ghauri & Grönhaug, 2010). 
There are different ways knowledge can be presented and the three basic models commonly used for 
inquiry  are  known  as  deduction, induction  and  abduction.  Whereas  the  former  bases  the  empirical 
observations on the theory, the second views theories as an outcome of the empirical findings. On the 
other  hand,  abduction  requires  a  more  systematic  combination  of  the  parts  involved in  the  research  
process, where the researcher moves between the empirical data and the theoretical framework. We reason 
that the chosen model in this thesis has been the inductive approach since empirical findings have been the 
main driver in our research process. Due to the fact that the field of study was rather unknown and needed  
sufficient research before determining the theoretical framework, this choice felt naturally most suitable 
and was also in line with our exploratory research design. Furthermore, our empirical findings have also  
been the factor determining the chosen theory, in order to ensure relevant and accurate interpretation and 
analysis (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). The inductive research approach is often used when conducting a  
qualitative study and as general conclusions are drawn based on the empirical data,  there is always a 
potential risk for conclusions that are not entirely certain, even though a high number of observations are 
made. However, except for the fact that this was the most suitable choice in consideration to our aim of 
study,  the logic  of  generating theory by observations is  also known to be the key and start  in  most  
scientific  methods (Ghauri  & Grönhaug,  2010).  Nevertheless,  throughout  the  process  of  research the 
theoretical framework has been modified as new empirical findings have been discovered. Thus, this has 
helped to gradually approach the core  of the research problem and therefore  we would not  label  the 
approach utilized as purely inductive since there are some signs of abduction along the process. 
2.2 Qualitative Approach
The  distinction  between  quantitative research  and  qualitative  research  is  that  the  former  focuses  on 
explanation and analysis on a statistical level where the collection of data is emphasized by structure, 
standards and abstract models. On the other hand, qualitative research focuses on the complexity of a  
phenomenon within a business context which provides a more critical, reflexive and analytical approach 
(Eriksson  &  Kovalainen,  2008).  In  addition,  Ghauri  and  Grönhaug  (2005)  suggests  that  qualitative 
research is useful in particular when earlier insights about a phenomenon that are being investigated are 
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moderate. This indicates that the approach is often rather exploratory and flexible in a sense that problems 
are indistinct as a result of modest insights. This thesis has been written based on a qualitative research 
strategy as the goal has been to understand the motives behind Chinese investments in African firms as 
well as its implications on economic development in the receiving countries. As the investigation has  
posed analytical challenges and required continuous data collection in order to be compared, interpreted  
and discussed, we found this research strategy most suitable. 
2.2.1 Case studies 
When writing a thesis several research methods can be used such as surveys, history and archival records. 
The research methods all differ in the way empirical evidence is being collected and analyzed. In this 
thesis  case studies have been utilized for the chosen topic.  The case study method is  relevant  when 
questions  such  as  “how”  and “why”  are  raised  and when  an  extended and detailed  description  of  a  
phenomenon is required. In case studies a wide range of evidence are used such as interviews, documents, 
artifacts and observations (Yin, 2003). 
Generally, building theories around the inductive model has been the preferable choice when conducting a 
case study. However, Welch et al. (2011) keep a relatively open-minded view of modes in theorizing case 
studies  and give  another  explanation  of  approaches  to  conducting  case  studies,  stating that  there  are 
multiple alternatives other than the inductive method. The second alternative predicates a case study on 
natural experiment as a way of transforming existing theories, whereas the third relates to case study by 
focusing on interpretive sensemaking, which means that the context or action is interpreted by emphasis 
on  human  understanding  and  experience.  The  fourth  and  most  recent  alternative  in  methodological  
literature refers to case study as an ability to obtain a contextualizing explanation. This alternative focuses 
less  on  uniformity,  aims  to  find  causes-of-effects  explanations  and  to  integrate  the  context  into  
explanation. All four alternatives have their advantages and disadvantages depending on what aspects that 
are focused on in the case study. However, Welch et al. (2011) argue that the classification of case studies  
are  often  difficult  to  make  and  that  the  way  case  studies  are  carried  out  are  known  to  be  hard  to 
differentiate compared to other qualitative methods.
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2.2.2 Choice of Case Studies 
After having conducted a case study research, we agree with Welch et al. (2011) that the type of method 
used is relatively difficult to define. However, we have found that among the given four alternatives, the  
most recent development, contextualizing explanation, fits best into our research approach even though it 
has elements of the inductive one as well.  We motivate the decision by the fact that  our focus is  to  
understand  the  context  and  gain  an  in-depth  knowledge  without  sacrificing  causal  explanations.  By 
contrast,  an  inductive  method  has  less  focus  on  the  context  integrated  into  explanation  and  tend  to  
prioritize a rather law-like explanatory and descriptive view more than an analytical and causes-of-effect  
explanation. 
In our case studies we have focused on studying three cases in depth rather than touching upon a wide  
range of cases as our aim is to increase the ability to make more in-depth findings, analyze and draw 
conclusions. This decision was also affected by the fact that the accessibility to relevant information on a  
micro-level has been limited, thus leading to the selection of case studies primarily based on accessibility  
and relevance. Nevertheless, the “China Global Investment Tracker” (The Heritage Foundation, 2014), a 
list  with Chinese global investments on a company level between 2005 and 2013, has been our most  
valuable source. The list enabled us to get an overview of Chinese investments, which helped us to select 
our case studies. More specifically, the list provided us with valuable information about the investing firm, 
the firm in the host country and the shareholder size, a necessary foundation which made it possible to  
select the most interesting cases and continue with a more targeted research. 
In  our  study we proceeded with a number  of  criteria  when selecting our  case  studies.  The investing 
Chinese enterprises are large MNEs that could be both state owned and privately owned. In addition, we  
studied cases where Chinese MNEs invested in African-based enterprises where the investments exceeded 
10% of voting power according to the definition of FDI (UNCTAD, 2013a). In regard to the list of China’s 
global investments, we saw a pattern where larger MNEs tended to make both larger and a higher number 
of investments. Thus these factors served as a foundation when selecting our case studies. 
2.3 Data Collection
When conducting a thesis, the data needed could be found in both primary and secondary sources. The 
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former refers to original data that is collected as a primary source with the aim to serve the purpose of the 
research problem directly, by for example conducting interviews. On the other hand, data collected by 
someone else where purposes might differ from one’s own is referred to as secondary data. This type of  
source is often important to obtain in order to facilitate understanding, analysis and explanations to the 
chosen research area. The fact that the data is secondary might however imply that the given information 
is biased or amplified, such as in cases where web pages of companies are used. Additionally, the scope, 
the time period and the related geographical location of given information need to be taken into account.  
However,  notable  organizations  gathering  information  generally  provide  wider  perspectives  to  ensure 
transparency and neutral information (Ghauri & Grönhaug, 2005).
Given the accessibility to gather information in the chosen field of study, the data collected in this thesis  
has been collected based on secondary sources. According to Ghauri and Grönhaug (2005) secondary data  
is often used as a dominant source when starting the research process, which has been the case while 
conducting  this  thesis.  This  source  is  known  to  be  time  saving  and  provides  the  researcher  with 
information to better  grasp the research  problem, advantages which have certainly been affecting the 
writing process of this thesis. This type of source has contributed to a comprehensive knowledge of the 
field of study, which has facilitated the ability to draw scientific conclusions. 
As a starting point to further understand the FDI flows on a more concrete level and judge whether our 
field of study would be feasible, we studied data and statistics provided by electronic databases such as the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the 
Ministry of  Commerce of China (MOFCOM) to mention some.  In addition,  we read several  articles 
mainly collected from the databases such as Business Source Premier and Science Direct provided by the 
University of Gothenburg, School of Business, Economics and Law. This was done with the aim to gain a 
deeper understanding of findings in existing studies in order to discover in what fields it was lacking and 
how it could be useful for our study. The keywords we based our research on were primarily: FDI, OFDI,  
China, Africa. This led to the finding of our most crucial data that enabled us to continue our study in this  
field, namely the China Global Investment Tracker. Moreover, we used the library collection LIBRIS to 
gain access to books and journals published by for example SAGE, Journal of International Business  
Studies and International Business Review related to our topic. Nevertheless, articles from Western news 
sources such as the Economist and New York Times and from the related geographic locations in the field 
of study, as for example African Business Magazine and China Daily have been utilized. These articles  
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have served as very important and complementary sources especially in our search for empirical evidence  
on a case study level. 
2.4 Qualitative Data Analysis 
The purpose with the analysis is to structure and interpret the collected findings in order to gain insights 
and give it a meaning (Marshall & Rossman, 1995). It is thus a process of gathering, reducing, displaying, 
dividing and narrowing down information with the goal to draw conclusions and answer the research 
question.  This process  poses analytical  challenges  of different kinds,  thus a good starting point is  to  
determine the most significant attributes of the data analysis (Ghauri & Grönhaug, 2005). 
In our case, the data found on FDI flows on a country level have been compared and narrowed down in  
order to select the most relevant African countries based on our criteria mentioned above. In the search for  
data on firm-level, we have used keywords such as:  acquisition, joint venture, Sinosteel, CNOOC  and 
Sinopec. The findings in our case studies have been sorted out by using a data reduction method, which is 
a process where data are selected, transformed and interpreted with the aim to understand and create a 
meaning of the observations. This helped us to select information and focus our study, which increased the  
ability to provide an explanation to our research question and identify patterns of the Chinese investments. 
Yet,  data  reduction  is  a  process  that  requires  accuracy  and  a  critical  approach  since  alternative 
explanations  other  to  what  has  been given are  most  likely to  occur  (Ghauri  & Grönhaug,  2005).  To 
overcome this risk, we have put much effort in our research process to ensure that the most significant  
data  related  to  our  study have  been  found.  The data  have  then  been compared and interpreted  from 
different perspectives as a way of trying to limit biased results or missing important data, which could 
affect the given explanation. In particular, this has been important in our case study since it is conducted 
on a micro-level As access to information and the possibility to compare cases have been rather limited, 
these  factors  might  however  affect  the  explanation  and  the  ability  to  identify  commonalities  and 
differences. 
2.5 Reliability and Validity 
Eriksson and Kovalainen (2011:63) claim that “One of the fundamental parts of research is the issue of  
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trust created in the research community”. Thus it is of high importance, regardless of what empirics are 
used, that the collected data is relevant and trustworthy (Jacobsen, 2000). When measuring the quality of a 
research study, in terms of credibility, it is common to use the standard criteria of reliability and validity  
(Yin, 2009). 
A study that has a high level of reliability assesses that the same results and conclusions can be given if 
repeated by another investigator with the same methods (Flick 2007; Yin, 2009). Validity refers to if the 
conclusions drawn describe and explain what it is intended to and if the findings are trustworthy (Eriksson 
& Kovalainen, 2008). Furthermore, it refers to the assessment whether the research has been carried out  
with objectivity, if relevant causes are explained when presenting the results and to what extent the results 
can be generalized (Yin, 2009).
Throughout the process when conducting the thesis, we have kept these terms in mind in order to provide  
a study with high quality. As a result, we decided from the beginning not to conduct any interviews, partly 
due to time- and resource constraints but also because of the vast geographical distance between us and  
potential respondents from companies in Africa as well as in China. The decision was made by taking the 
objectivity  into  consideration.  If  our  data  collection  would  derive  from  interviews  rather  than  from 
secondary  sources,  we  argue  that  the  potential  risk  for  biased  information,  questioning  the  level  of 
objectivity and reliability, would have been considerably higher. In addition, we believe that there is a risk 
that  errors and bias could occur from us as interviewers if structuring and conducting the interviews, 
making it difficult to know who the respondent on the other side of the world would be. In addition, given 
answers could be interpreted differently depending on how the questions are raised and who is answering 
them. 
Another factor influencing this choice was related to our chosen topic, which treats a rather sensitive  
subject where the potential risk for biased and inaccurate information received from distant respondents 
was considered as very high. According to Ghauri and Grönhaug (2010), interviews are rather difficult to 
interpret and the risk for influencing the given answers might lead to issues of objectivity. Moreover, since 
the aim with an interview is to obtain valid and truthful information from the right respondent involved in 
the field of study, the risks with conducting interviews were considered as even higher. As a result, we saw 
the risks of conducting interviews outweighing the benefits, but we also saw the decision to base our study 
on secondary data as an interesting and challenging method to use.
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As our data collection has been based on secondary sources we are aware that they might be biased.  
However, in order to reduce elements of subjectivity, we have used evidence from multiple sources and 
chosen our sources by carefully reviewing the content, of which many are brought from highly credible 
databases. Furthermore, we selected the most relevant sources by questioning the publisher and author as 
well as when it was written, and always referred to peer-reviewed sources as far as it has been possible. In  
regard to the importance of reliability, we have also made sure to present the data collected from a wider  
perspective,  for  example  by  providing  empirical  information  from  different  perspectives  if  our 
observations revealed that more than one explanation was needed. We reason that the ability to keep a  
wider approach would have been more limited if conducting this type of study based on interviews. In 
addition,  the  data  collection  from interviews  is  rather  difficult  to  verify  whereas  the  data  from our  
secondary sources are well documented and easier to access, thus increasing the level of reliability.
LeCompte and Goetz (1982) claim that the researcher’s observations should be carried out in accordance 
with his or her theoretical ideas. However there is a risk that  researcher bias might occur. According to 
Burke (1997:284)“research bias  tends to  result  from selective  observation  and selective  recording of  
information,  and  also  from  allowing  one’s  personal  views  and  perspectives  to  affect  how  data  are  
interpreted  and  how the  research  is  conducted”.  Since  our  data  has  been  based  on  collection  from 
secondary sources it has been crucial to critically reflect our own subjectivity and tendency to affect the  
research process and conclusions, something that could be referred to as reflexivity. 
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3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
3.1 Motivation of Theories 
As the emergence of FDI has been observed in recent decades, several theories have been developed with 
the  aim  to  explain  why  MNEs  exist  as  well  as  describe  their  internationalization  process.  Many 
researchers such as Stephen Hymer (1960, 1976), Raymond Vernon (1966), Peter J. Buckley and Mark 
Casson (1976) have examined the motivations associated with FDI that drive companies to invest abroad 
rather than exporting or outsourcing their production. Over the years, however, many theories have been 
unable to fully explain and capture the complexity with the rise in FDIs (Dunning, 2000).
In the following section we will present the theoretical framework that has been utilized in this thesis 
when analyzing Chinese OFDIs into African firms. The choice of our key theory is motivated by the fact  
that John H. Dunning’s eclectic paradigm (1977) is one of the most dominated and utilized frameworks 
when studying and explaining MNE’s foreign activities (e.g. Alon et al., 2012; Kolstad & Wiig, 2009). In 
addition, over the past decades, the eclectic paradigm has become a general framework covering various  
theories, which further strengthens its impact within the field of international business (Dunning, 1993). 
3.2 Internalization Theory 
A well established theory that explains the existence of the MNE is the internalization theory which is a  
“[...] firm-level  theory  explaining  why  the  MNE will  exert  proprietary  control  (ownership)  over  an  
intangible, knowledge-based, firm-specific advantage (FSA)” (Rugman, 2010:3). The theory is based on 
Ronald  Coase’s  work  in  1937 and over  the  past  decades  the  theory  has  been  developed  by  several  
researchers such as Buckley and Casson in the 1970s, contributing to the understanding of the governance  
of the MNE (Buckley & Casson, 2009).
In the initial  work Coase (1937) argued that a firm would exist if the transaction costs of organizing 
exchanges within a company would be lower than on the market. But as the production of goods and 
services have become more sophisticated, they have come to include intermediate products and not only  
materials but also intangible assets such as knowledge and expertise (Buckley & Casson, 1976). Thus this 
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has required an effective coordination of these activities in a market involving a large number of trading  
partners. Nonetheless, the external markets for intermediate products suffer from imperfections, especially 
in  knowledge  intensive  markets  (DeGennaro,  2005).  According  to  Buckley  and Casson (1976)  these 
imperfections mainly include considerable time lags,  buyer uncertainty and government interventions. 
Thus the internalization theory (e.g. Buckley and Casson, 1976; Hennart, 1982; Rugman, 1981) suggests  
that  MNEs,  due  to  market  imperfections,  benefit  when  coordinating  their  economic  activities  and 
operations  under  common  ownership  rather  than  by  intermediate  firms.  Consequently,  when  these 
activities are located in different countries the MNE will emerge. 
3.3 The Eclectic Paradigm 
The eclectic paradigm, commonly known as the OLI-model, is a theory that was published by Dunning in 
a number of publications (e.g. 1977, 1980, 1988, 1992, 1993, 1995, 2000). It is a further development of  
the  internalization  theory  (Buckley  & Casson 1976),  which  “[...]  seeks  to  identify  and  evaluate  the  
determinants of international business (IB) activity” (Dunning, 2003:3). In the general OLI-model, three 
interdependent variables are carried out in three sub-paradigms:
The first letter “O” derives from Ownership specific advantages (or Firm Specific Advantages, FSAs) that 
often refer to intangible assets such as brand name, technology and benefits of economies of scale that are 
being  transferred  within  the  MNE.  The  sub-paradigm suggests  that,  if  the  investing  company  has  a 
competitive advantage that outshines those of the firm in the host country, the more likely the firm will  
engage in production overseas. Moreover these advantages need to outweigh costs that often arise in order 
to successfully operate on the international market (Dunning, 1980, 1988, 2000). When looking further 
into a company’s O specific advantages, these can be divided into three types (Dunning, 1980): 
1. Monopoly - advantages which provide beneficial access to markets by means of ownership of 
scarce natural resources, trademarks and patents.
2. Technology - knowledge advantages which cover a wide range of innovation related activities. 
3. Economies of large size - advantages in learning, economies of scale and scope and broader access 
to financing.
The second letter “L” derives from Location specific advantages (or Country Specific Advantages, CSAs), 
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which refers to the company finding it more beneficial to exploit its ownership specific advantages by  
engaging in FDI instead of renting them or selling them to foreign firms.  More specifically, location 
advantages of different countries are crucial when MNEs make the decision on which country that will be 
hosting their value adding activities (Dunning, 1980, 1988). Each country’s specific advantages can be 
separated into three classes (Denisia, 2010; Hanson, 2001):
1. Economic advantages - advantages associated with factors of production, cost of transport, cost of 
communication, scope and size of the market etc.
2. Political advantages - favorable FDI policies implemented by governments.
3. Social advantages - benefits that relates to physical distance between markets, cultural diversity  
etc. 
The third and last letter “I” derives from Internalization. As Dunning was influenced by his colleagues and 
their internalization work (Buckley & Casson, 1976), he incorporated the internalization variable in his  
own model (Rugman, 2010). When a firm has managed to develop its ownership specific advantages and 
transferred  these  advantages  to  new  markets  based  on  location  specific  advantages,  it  undertakes  
internalization  the  greater  the  advantages  of  producing  overseas  rather  than  through  e.g.  licensing 
(Dunning,  1980,  1988).  The  OLI  parameters  vary  among  companies  and  highly  depend  on  the  host 
country’s characteristics. Thus, the goals and the strategies as well as the production of a company will  
vary due to challenges and opportunities in different countries (Dunning, 2000; Hennart, 1982). 
According to Dunning (2000:164) “The eclectic paradigm further asserts that the precise configuration of  
the OLI parameters facing any particular firm, and the response of the firm to that configuration, is  
strongly contextual”. The theory particularly provides different contextual variables, for example insights  
about the economic and political foundation of the country or region related to the investing firm but also 
the characteristics of the hosting country that will receive the investment. Additionally, it also reflects the 
industry and the nature of the activities that add value to the firm but also the specific features of the  
investing  firm,  its  objectives  and  strategies  and  the  overall  reason  behind  the  FDI.  The  latter  is  a  
contextual variable in which researchers have recognized four key points that describe the motives behind 
MNE foreign involvement (Dunning, 1993, 2000): 
1. The so called market-seeking aspects which involve investments that aim to reach new attractive 
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markets and satisfy customer demand by engaging in FDI. 
2. FDI  with  resource-seeking or  supply  oriented  motives,  that  relate  to  the  access  of  acquiring 
resources in different forms such as minerals and oil but also high-skilled labor.
3. Foreign activities developed to foster efficiency-seeking FDI such as enhanced division of labor or 
existing portfolios that are specialized in either foreign or domestic assets, a form of FDI often 
derived from the two other types mentioned above. 
4. FDI  emphasized  by  strategic  asset-seeking  motives,  attempted  to  protect  or  improve  the 
ownership specific advantages of the paradigm, related to the investing firm. This is often done by 
acquiring strategic assets from the firm in the host country in order to maintain or strengthen its  
position among competitors.
It should be noted however that since the eclectic paradigm first was published, nearly forty years ago,  
several events have occurred in the world economy. These events have changed the characteristics and  
pattern of international production and thus led to modifications and sometimes even replacements in  
existing explanations and related economic and business theories (e.g. Mathews 2006,  Rugman 1981, 
2010).  In  addition,  the ownership  specific  advantages  have  changed as  markets  have  opened up  and 
moved towards knowledge intensive activities. This has resulted in the emersion of alliance capitalism and 
firms seeking to use FDI as a tool to protect and exploit their existing O specific advantages. Due to these  
changes,  there are raised concerns  whether the specific O advantages still  can be incorporated in the  
general paradigm that was first presented (Dunning, 1993, 1995). 
3.4 Criticism to the Eclectic Paradigm
Although the eclectic paradigm has served as a dominant framework within the field of IB for explaining  
why firms exploit their production overseas, it has also been criticized. Alan M. Rugman (2010) argues in  
his article “Reconciling internalization theory and the eclectic paradigm” that Dunning’s OLI-model is 
somewhat lacking as it focuses on OFDI into host economies. Thus his OLI variables and four motives for 
FDI (natural  resources-seeking,  market-seeking,  efficiency-seeking and strategic  asset-seeking) are  all  
based on the host economy’s point of view and do not consider changes that occur in the home market. 
The  OLI-model  has  also been criticized for  being  outdated  and limited as  it  only explains  FDI that 
involves large MNEs in developed economies.  Over the past  decade,  recent research has to a greater  
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extent focused on FDI from developing economies, in particular on latecomer and newcomer MNEs from 
East Asian countries. Thus there is an ongoing debate whether the OLI-model should be modified or 
replaced by new models to fit the characteristics of developing economies (Li, 1994; Li, 2003; Matthews, 
2002; Matthews, 2006; Yeung, 1994). The OLI-model has also been challenged as it implies that MNE 
latecomers and newcomers tend to invest in less developed countries, which is proven not to be the case 
for countries such as China,  South Korea and Taiwan whose FDIs lately have been directed towards 
United States as well as countries in Europe. Furthermore, when considering entry modes, the OLI-model 
has been challenged as it emphasizes full internalization whereas MNE latecomers and newcomers often 
undertake partial internalization or enter countries overseas utilizing external modes (Li, 2003; Matthews 
2006). Next,  we will  highlight some disparities between the eclectic paradigm and the internalization  
theory and briefly present two models that could serve as complementary models to Dunning’s OLI-model 
in order to fully explain the determinants of FDI in our field of study.
3.5 Comparing the Eclectic Paradigm with the Internalization Theory 
Since  the  eclectic  paradigm  and  the  internalization  theory  first  were  published,  both  theories  have  
provided a foundation for the current theory of the MNE within the field of IB (Verbeke, 2009). Even 
though they are greatly intertwined, there are some important disparities between the theories that will 
now be addressed. 
Whereas the O-advantages in the internalization theory are efficiency-based and applied on transaction  
cost  theories,  the  eclectic  paradigm  deals  with  asset-based  O-advantages.  Thus  Dunning’s  eclectic  
paradigm focuses  more  on the transaction,  yet  an  industry-level  analysis,  whereas  the  internalization 
theory focuses on the firm as the unit of analysis of their strategic decision-making (Buckley & Casson,  
1976; Hennart, 1982; Rugman, 1981). Moreover, the theories differ in the sense that they deal with entry 
modes differently. The internalization theory avers that the choice of entry mode for an MNE, whether 
through FDI or  another mode of entry,  depends on the relative  costs and benefits  over  time.  It  also  
highlights the potential risks associated with foreign entries, especially in hazardous market. The eclectic  
paradigm, on the other hand, has a broader approach and focuses on the O, L and I parameters on an 
industry-level. To sum up, the eclectic paradigm provides more descriptive explanations of OFDI motives 
while the internalization theory has a narrower and more analytical approach (Rugman, 2010). 
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3.6 The FSA/CSA Matrix
As  Dunning’s  eclectic  paradigm  only  focuses  on  host  countries,  Rugman  suggests  that  the  eclectic 
paradigm  could  be  reconciled  with  Rugman’s  traditional  firm  and  country  matrix  (1981),  which  in 
addition to the eclectic paradigm also includes MNE activity in  home countries. It should be noted that 
Rugman’s traditional FSA/CSA matrix in fact can be used when looking into host country aspects as well,  
simply by relabeling his original matrix or use a second matrix where host country CSAs are considered 
(Rugman, 2010).
Whereas Rugman’s FSA/CSA matrix consists of two axis, Dunning’s eclectic paradigm is composed by 
three variables. Thus it could be questioned how Dunning’s eclectic paradigm could be well incorporated 
in Rugman’s FSA/CSA matrix. First, when comparing Dunning’s location variable with Rugman’s CSA 
factors  they  match  almost  perfectly.  Dunning’s  location  specific  advantages  from  a  host  country 
perspective include factors such as natural resources, size of the market, labor as well as culture. Moreover 
the location specific advantages include government behavior in the host country. Although there is some 
disparities  when  defining  the  location  variable,  there  is  generally  no  substantial  difference  when 
incorporating Dunning’s location variable with Rugman’s CSA axis (ibid.). 
Rugman suggests that the remaining variables, the ownership variable and internalization variable could 
be combined and integrated in the FSA axis of the matrix as he argues that both ownership advantages and 
internalization advantages of the MNE are firm specific. Thus MNEs according to Dunning’s model use a  
combination of internalizing and exercise control of firm specific advantages when undertaking OFDI 
(ibid.). 
Finally,  when  considering  Dunning’s  four  motives  (e.g.  Dunning  1980,  1988,  2000)  for  undertaking 
OFDI; natural resource-seeking, market-seeking, efficiency-seeking and strategic asset-seeking, they can 
also be reconciled with the FCA/CSA matrix as illustrated in figure 2. below. In the first cell the factors in 
the host country become crucial as the home country lacks in FSAs. Hence an MNE undertakes FDI in 
order to exert control over natural resources endowments, cheap labor force and take advantages of fair 
government policies in the host country. Moreover the MNE strives for a larger consumer base and a 
market with well established infrastructure as well as supplier networks. The first cell also incorporates 
efficiency based factors, in particular cost savings in labor in the foreign country (Rugman, 2010). 
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In the second cell no FDI will be undertaken when both the home country and host country can not take 
advantage of FSA and CSAs. Likewise, none of Dunning’s four motives are included in the fourth cell and 
no FDI will take place. This goes in line with his OLI-model that suggests that the determinants behind 
OFDI are based on high CSAs in the host country. Finally the third cell deals with asset-seeking motives 
as MNEs, in particular those from emerging countries, use OFDI as a tool to gain knowledge in the host 
country. However, this form of FDI has been discussed over the course of the past two decades. In many 
cases it is not certain whether the host country actually prefers to sell their knowledge assets or not, and it  
is questioned if the knowledge is transferred to the home countries (ibid.). 
Figure 2. The FSA/CSA matrix reconciled with the motives for FDI in the eclectic paradigm (Rugman, 2010)
3.7 The LLL-Model 
As previously discussed, the OLI-model focuses primarily on large MNEs from developed economies.  
Whereas firms in developed countries use internationalization as a means to exploit existing resources, 
latecomer and newcomer MNEs from developing countries expand overseas to get hold of resources they 
lack on the domestic market (Mathews, 2006). Thus they primarily use FDI as a tool to overcome their  
existing disadvantages, which challenges the traditional OLI-model  (Li, 2003; Mathews, 2006). Hence 
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John A. Mathews put  forward a  complementary  model,  the  LLL-model,  which asserts  that;“[...]MNE 
latecomers engage in FDI to achieve new competitive advantages via external  linkage, leverage and  
learning rather than exploiting existing internal advantages via internal control”  (Li, 2007:299). What 
characterizes the latecomer and newcomer firms, according to Mathews, is that they internationalize at a  
very rapid pace. This is a result of organizational innovation as the latecomers and newcomers look at  
other established firms in order to adopt the way they organize, which could range from clusters to highly 
globally integrated organizations. Finally, they are strategically innovative as they have to find means to  
enter markets with already operating skilled firms (Mathews, 2006). 
What motivated Mathews to his research was that he wanted to know how challenger firms, particularly 
those from from the Asia Pacific region, could successfully beat already existing, highly competitive firms 
on the international  market.  This was the case for firms such as Ispat  International  and Acer that  he 
referred  to  as  the  “Dragon  Multinationals”  which,  despite  initially  small  markets,  low  skills  and 
knowledge started off far behind and managed to internationalize and become industry leaders in many 
sectors in a short period of time (ibid.). In fact, Ispat, today a part of ArcelorMittal (Bloomberg, 2004), 
started off as a small Indonesian based company in the 1970s (Mathews, 2006) and over the course of the 
past  decades  the  company  has  become  the  largest  steel  producer  and  among  the  most  globalized 
companies worldwide (Sull, 1999). 
Mathews  argues  that  a  the  key  success  factor  for  the  latecomer  firms  lies  behind  the  widespread  
globalization. As a result of market openness, liberalization in trade and deregulation, the international 
marketplace  has  become  more  integrated.  The  globalization  has  thus  created  opportunities  for  the 
latecomer  and newcomer  firms  who  have  been  able  to  take  advantages  by  penetrating  into  Western 
markets and adapting and learning advanced technologies (Mathews, 2006).
Mathews LLL-model  can be summed up as  follows:  The first  term  linkage  refers to  latecomers and 
newcomers at an initial point seeking and acquiring resource advantages outside of their own economy. In  
order to overcome initial restrictions on the domestic market, due to lack of potential knowledge, a global  
approach is emphasized for their expansion. Moreover, a foreign partnership such as joint ventures (JVs)  
are the most common form of entry to be linked up in networks and exchange sources of advantages. The 
second term leverage refers to what extent these links can be leveraged as well as how resources can be 
imitated, transferred and substituted on the new market. Finally, the determinant of a firm’s successful 
organizational learning is a result of a firm’s repeated adaption of linkage and leverage (ibid.). 
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According  to  Mathews  the  LLL-model  (2006)  can  serve  as  a  strategic  framework  for  all  kinds  of  
companies, including small and medium enterprises (SMEs) as a means for a successive expansion in the 
global marketplace. These stages in the process of a latecomer firm engaging in FDI could be highlighted 
in the example of Ispat. Starting off with very small mills and low skills in technology, Ispat dispersed 
their operations worldwide by leveraging acquisitions of state-owned steel plants overseas and utilizing 
new technology and integrated management systems. Ispat made use of their latecomer advantage and  
once it became a part of a global network the company started to make acquisitions in Europe and the  
United States as well. Finally in 2004 Ispat became the number one company within the steel industry.
After having studied Mathews’ LLL-model (2006) our received apprehension is that the model mainly 
serves to explain the process of FDI engagement from the investing firm’s perspective. Moreover, we 
argue that the model describes the linkage, leverage and learning process when a firm from a developing  
or emerging economy undertakes investments in a developed country. This would imply that the model in 
this  case  could  explain  China’s  global  approach  where  the linkage,  leverage  and learning  process  is 
targeted primarily towards developed countries. However, as we study China’s engagement in Africa we 
will utilize the model trying to describe how the LLL variables could be analyzed when investing in less  
developed countries. Moreover, we will also try to apply the LLL variables on a host country perspective. 
3.8 Summary of Theoretical Framework
To sum up, the eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1977), which is a further development of the internalization 
theory (e.g. Buckley & Casson, 1976; Coase, 1937; Hennart, 1982; Rugman, 1981), has been used as a 
solid ground within IB and for further development in subsequent theories within the field. Therefore, we 
have argued that the OLI-model (Dunning, 1980, 1988) is an extensive and compatible theory suitable for 
our study as it provides a foundation for understanding our empirical findings from a wide perspective.  
Nevertheless,  we are aware that  a paradigm of such significance also has been widely discussed and  
criticized in recent years. The widespread globalization has considerably changed the global marketplace,  
which has  made the model  rather  outdated.  This  is clearly evident  in  emerging markets  where many 
economies have faced accelerated internalization. Moreover the OLI-model is focusing on host countries, 
excluding  factors  that  change  in  the  home  market.  This  chapter  has  hence  emphasized  the  ongoing 
discussion of the OLI-model and presented the recent development of the FSA/CSA matrix (Rugman, 
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1981, 2010) and the LLL-model (Mathews, 2006) as complementary theories adjusted to the prevailing 
circumstances in the world economy.
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4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
4.1. Country Level
As shown below in figure 3., Africa is currently a continent with high potential and economic growth,  
which has created great business opportunities and attracted investors from all over the world. According 
to African Economic Outlook, a list brought up by the IMF and The Economist, six out of the ten fastest  
growing  economies  in  the  world  are  African.  When  comparing  the  continent  to  other  developing 
economies,  the return on investment in Africa is  in fact  higher and its  rather unexploited markets of  
natural resources have attracted a large number of investors (KPMG, 2013). 
Figure 3. Overview of Africa’s historical and expected growth trends (African Economic Outlook, 2012)
The figure below shows Chinese OFDI flows (in millions of USD) by country in Africa between 2004-
2010 (see figure 4.). As the flows vary both in size and in relation to other African countries over time, we 
have calculated the average flow between 2004-2010 for every country in order to rank the countries with 
the highest inflows and get an idea of where the FDI flows are targeted. As shown in the figure the top five 
countries  receiving  the  highest  levels  of  FDI  are  South  Africa,  Nigeria,  Algeria,  Zambia  and  the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 
As earlier discussed, our initial thought was to select cases in the top five FDI receiving countries in 
Africa since we believed that higher inflows of FDI naturally would provide us with more valuable data. 
However,  when  conducting  the  thesis  there  were  several  parameters  that  needed  to  be  taken  into 
consideration. The selected countries are not only based on the highest average inflows of FDI, but also on 
the relevance and the type of data collected from the case studies as previously stated. Therefore, besides  
South Africa and Nigeria, Angola has been chosen to be examined based on the information found on a 
micro-level. Next, we will present a brief country overview and general characteristics of South Africa, 
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Nigeria and Angola in order to gain a better understanding of why these countries have received high 
levels of FDI. Later on, this chapter will present three selected case studies of Chinese MNE’s OFDI into 
South Africa, Nigeria and Angola. The chosen case studies involve Chinese MNE’s OFDI with a share of 
over 10% in African based firms in the energy and metals sectors.
Figure 4. Chinese OFDI into African countries in millions of USD (MOFCOM, 2011)
4.1.1 Country Profile: South Africa 
Historically, South Africa was a British colony until 1934 and it was not until 1994 the country gained 
their independence from the white minority rule. Today, the country is a constitutional democracy with a  
government system that operates on a national, provincial and local level (BBC, 2014). 
Over  the course  of the past  decade South Africa has  become a  frontrunner,  surpassing other  African  
nations in terms of FDI attractiveness (Davie, 2013). With a GDP at $384.3 billion USD in 2012 (The  
World Bank, 2014a), South Africa stands as the economic powerhouse of Africa making it one of the top 
emerging markets in the world. Besides, in 2010 South Africa was admitted to BRICS, former BRIC, 
consisting of four of the major emerging economies in the world; Brazil, Russia, India and China (The 
Economist, 2013a).
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South Africa is characterized by its diverse industries and some of the most potential sectors are in agro-
processing, business process outsourcing, transport equipment, metals and electrical machinery, advanced 
manufacturing and tourism to mention some (The DTI, 2013a). In 2012 South Africa alone attracted about  
a  fifth  of  all  FDIs  into Africa  (Davie,  2013).  Particularly,  South Africa  has  an abundance of  natural  
resources such as gold, coal and iron ore but also attracts a lot of investments in the oil and gas sector 
(KPMG, 2013). 
There are many reasons why foreign investors are seeking the South African market. First of all, South  
Africa has a favorable location as investors have great opportunities in reaching the South African market  
but the country is also a gateway to the rest of the continent (The DTI, 2013b), whose economy lately has 
grown  faster  than  any  other  continent  in  the  world  (Davie,  2013).  Secondly,  when  considering  its 
demography, South Africa has reached an upper middle income level (The World Bank, 2014a), which has 
enabled greater consumption. Also, the country has an abundance of both a semi- and unskilled labor and 
due  to  legislation  introduced  by  the  South  African  government,  it  has  helped  building  skills  and 
competences of world class (The DTI, 2013b). 
Thirdly, South Africa is one the most business friendly countries on the continent with well established 
infrastructure, which is the most developed in Africa (KPMG, 2013). The country also attracts a large 
number of investments in research and development (R&D). It is also one of the leading countries in green 
technologies which has created many sustainable jobs (The DTI,  2013b). Lastly,  South Africa enjoys 
political and macroeconomic stability and along with a preserved democracy (Davie, 2013) over the past 
twenty  years,  the  nation has  created a  positive  business  climate.  South Africa  has  become a  popular 
destination as investors who seek to do business in the country can assure that investment requirements  
and trade rules are being met in the country (The DTI, 2013b). According to the World Bank’s list of 
“Ease of doing business” South Africa currently ranks #41 out of 189 countries (The World Bank, 2014b)  
and ranks higher than the other member countries of BRICS (KPMG, 2013). 
4.1.2 Country Profile: Nigeria 
Nigeria was a British colony until its independence in 1960 and is a federal constitutional republic with a  
multi-party system (KPMG, 2012). The country is Africa’s largest country in terms of population size with 
the largest oil and natural gas reserves, which makes them a very important oil exporter in the continent  
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(World Bank, 2013a). Furthermore, Nigeria has a low-cost labor force and with its large population size,  
the country has potentially the largest domestic market in sub-Saharan Africa (KPMG, 2012). During the 
first decade of the millennium, the economy in Nigeria has seen a steady GDP growth, amounting to an 
average of 7.6% between 2003 and 2010 (World Bank, 2013a). According to KPMG, Nigeria was ranked 
as the fourth most popular destination in the world attracting investment and fostering growth (This Day  
Live, 2013) and it is projected that in 2020 Nigeria will become one of the world’s top 20 economies 
(KPMG, 2012).
On a global scale, Nigeria ranked the 8th largest oil exporter in the world in 2012 (Oluduro, 2012). Over 
the past years, the country has worked hard to enhance governance in the oil industry, for example by 
being  one  of  the  pioneers  among  other  African  countries  to  implement  the  Extractive  Industries 
Transparency  Initiative  (EITI).  The  aim  with  EITI,  supported  by  the  World  Bank,  is  to  facilitate  
transparency,  improved  governance  and  accountability  in  countries  with  an  abundance  of  resources 
operating within the oil, gas and mining industries (World Bank, 2013b).
The Nigerian government has also tried to diversify its economy by fostering growth opportunities in the  
non-oil sectors and by introducing reforms in line with IMF’s requirements (KPMG, 2012). As a key step 
to improve the power sector, the Nigerian government decided to undertake a reform in 2005, which has 
posed some challenges along the following years.  In 2010,  the process of continuing the reform was 
implemented as a governmental strategy to improve power supply, open up the private sector and the 
services  sector  in  Nigeria  (World  Bank,  2013a).  The  investments  in  power  supply  are  believed  to 
contribute to economic growth, value added and the development of other sectors in the country. Except  
for improvements in the energy sector,  the government has also made efforts to enhance the business 
environment in Nigeria with the aim to promote FDIs with high returns. The country serves as regional 
hub in the sectors of manufacturing, service and innovation.  In addition, the goal  to develop a well-
functioning infrastructure system has been highly prioritized as a way of enhancing transport capabilities 
and  therefore  ease  the  operations  and increasing  productivity  of  businesses  (Mordi,  2013).  However,  
impediments to economic growth still  prevail, such as the lack of sufficient infrastructure and energy 
supplies. Besides, issues of corruption and stability in the regulatory environment and the pace of reforms 
are still factors hampering investments (KPMG, 2012). In fact, Nigeria ranked as low as #153 out of 187 
in the United Nation’s (UN) Human Development Index (HDI) conducted in 2012 (UN, 2013). Other  
factors limiting the macroeconomic environment in Nigeria are the insufficient welfare system, the lack of 
job opportunities and still prevailing poverty (World Bank, 2013c).
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More recently, analysts have turned their attention to Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey referred to as 
the Mint countries that are expected to be the “next giants”. The Mint term was developed by Jim O’Neill  
who also came up with the BRIC acronym in 2001 for identifying the current emerging economic powers  
in  the  world.  Besides  being  populous  nations,  the  economies  of  the  Mint  club  have  favorable  
demographics with a potentially strong work force consisting of a large number of young people. If the 
four countries act together, it is believed that their growth can be as high as China’s double digit growth  
rates were between 2003-2005. Furthermore, Mint can put pressure on Nigeria in becoming a member of  
the G20 as the other countries already are (BBC, 2014). 
4.1.3 Country Profile: Angola
Angola  is  located  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  and  was  controlled  by  the  Portuguese  until  1975,  an 
independence that was gained by an anti-colonial war that lasted for fourteen years. Nevertheless, the  
country struggled with a long civil-war for twenty-seven years and it was not until 2002 peace prevailed in 
Angola. Politically, Angola is a unitary republic with a multiparty presidential regime and had its first 
post-war legislative elections in 2008. Unlike South Africa and Nigeria, the country’s economy is mainly 
driven by its abundance of oil reserves, where oil accounts for nearly 80% of governmental revenues  
(Jover et al., 2012). Besides, oil stands for 98% of their export and is the primary resource that attracts  
FDI into the country, where China alone stands for 40% of Angola’s total oil exports (ibid.). In fact,  
Angola together with Saudi Arabia is China’s largest and most important source of oil (The Economist, 
2011). These factors have contributed to Angola becoming increasingly stable as an economy with an 
average real GDP growth of 11.6% accounted for the period between 2002-2011 (Jover et al., 2012). 
Although Angola is highly dependent on global oil prices, the country has managed to reduce inflation and 
revenues  from  the  oil  sector  have  fostered  fiscal  expansion,  increased  domestic  demand  and  the 
stimulation and development of other non-oil sectors. However, poverty still prevails and living standards 
are generally low, ranking Angola #148 out of 187 countries according to UN’s HDI (Jover et al., 2012). 
In 2006, Angola was accepted as a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) and its  oil  reserves  have been used as  a  security  when receiving financial  support  from the 
Chinese government. As a result, Angola was granted the first oil-backed loan by the Chinese Exim Bank 
in 2004. Such inflows of capital from major banks in China have contributed to great improvements in for 
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example the infrastructure in the country. In return, China has got access to Angola’s natural resources 
endowments and an increased number of Chinese contractors have been granted in the country (ibid.).
4.2 South Africa: Sinosteel Corporation - Samancor Chrome Minerals
Sinosteel Corporation, also known as Sinosteel, is a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) and a leading 
developer  and processor  in  metallurgical  and  mineral  resources.  As  of  today the company  has  great  
influence in the steel industry in China and is an important supplier for many leading Chinese steel mills. 
Already back in the 1980s Sinosteel strived for economic and technological collaboration and was one of 
the first SOEs to engage on the global market and develop resources overseas. As of today the enterprise 
has 86 subsidiaries, of which 23 operate abroad (Sinosteel Corporation, 2007). 
In November 2006 Sinosteel expanded to the African market and signed two deals. The first agreement 
that  was reached resulted  in  a  strategic  partnership  between Sinosteel  and China  Development  Bank 
(CDB) with Samancor Chrome (Reuters, 2006), a South African enterprise and one of the world’s largest 
producer of chrome ore and ferrochrome (Samancor Chrome, 2008) that currently owns 70% of the total 
ferrochrome ore resources in South Africa (Qiao, 2006). In the deal  the Chinese bank agreed to help 
finance rising expansions of ferrochrome in South Africa (Reuters, 2006). 
The second agreement resulted in a JV between Sinosteel and Samancor Chrome to exploit chrome ore 
resources in South Africa, which formed the company Tubatse Chrome Minerals,  in which Samancor  
Chrome had 50% and the remaining 50% was sold to Sinosteel (Tubatse Chrome Minerals Pty. Ltd., 2008) 
for $230 million USD (Forbes, 2010; The Heritage Foundation, 2014). Tubatse Chrome would be able to 
produce 1.6 million tons of chrome ore and approximately 300 000 tons of ferrochrome every year. In 
addition,  the  JV would  possess  chrome ore  resources  seven times greater  than  the total  chrome ore  
reserves in China (Qiao, 2006). Later on in 2008, Sinosteel established its subregional headquarter  in 
Sandton, Johannesburg (Rabede, 2013). 
According  to  the  Sinosteel  representative  the  agreement  was  a  win-win  project  as  Samancor  has  an 
abundance of chrome ore resources, something China wants to get hold of as a resource scarce country.  
Moreover, Liu Dong, MD of Tubatse Chrome minerals, pointed out that Sinosteel would enjoy a number 
of benefits when operating in South Africa. By having the smelters close to the mines the products would 
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leave the South African market with enhanced quality (Qiao, 2006). The Sinosteel representative also 
asserted that Samancor had the tools needed to promote Sinosteel’s business in the long-term; 
“Its efficient equipment and infrastructure for mining, ore selecting and metallurgy are a foundation for  
further development” (Qiao, 22 December 2006)    
In return, Sinosteel would provide the South African company with technology, management, marketing 
and fundraising (Qiao, 2006). According to Samancor the cash received from the deal would later be used 
for  reinvestments  in mineral  processing which,  if  successful,  would  double their  production by 2015 
(Steelguru,  2006). Moreover,  Samancor’s  CEO  Jurgen  Schalamon  argued  that  the  partnership  with 
Sinosteel would provide Samancor with access to the Chinese market for ferrochrome: 
“Sinosteel is a strategic partner, they have a good knowledge of the Chinese market and offer good entry  
points for Samancor into the Chinese market for ferrochrome,” (Hill, 30 April 2007). 
Besides the JV with Samancor, Sinosteel has been involved in other successful joint mining ventures in 
South Africa. According to Dong, part of the success could be explained by the healthy relationships  
between South African and Chinese government. As early as in 1997 the JV ASA Metals was established,  
consisting  of  the  Chinese  East  Asia  Metals  Investment  (EAMI),  a  100%  subsidiary  of  Sinosteel  
Corporation  and Limpopo Economic  Development  Enterprise  (LimDev).  The  deal  was  timely  as  the 
Limpopo  mine  previously  only  had  been  used  as  a  training  mine.  When  investing  in  South  Africa 
Sinosteel has, unlike many other Chinese enterprises used the local workforce and management expertise,  
which is also the case in both Tubatse Chrome and ASA Metals. For instance, at ASA Metals only four  
workers out of 1525 are Chinese and at Tubatse only two workers out of 1344 are Chinese. Moreover, Nan 
Fengzhi, MD of Sinosteel South Africa argued that the company takes responsibility in the South African  
society. For example, a JV with local communities were established in order to build a recovery plant as 
well as improve water supplies, schools and hospitals  for the local people (Rabede, 2013). Moreover, 
Fengzhi said: 
"We are also cautious, when we procure or source material from our clients, that we encourage our clients 
— particularly the 70% sourcing business — to be BEE compliant," (Rabede, 25 January 2013). 
where the term Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) in short refers to a policy where the government  
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ensures  that  black  people  in  South  Africa  are  equally  treated  and participating  in  the  economy (The 
Economist, 2010).
However it should be noted that it has been argued that unlike many other agreements between China and 
Africa the establishment of Tubatse has mainly been driven by business- and profit making motives rather 
than to provide China with raw materials. According to Samancor’s chairman Danko Konchar, Samancor 
would be debt free after Sinosteel’s 50% acquisition of Tubatse (Reuters, 2006). He stated that: 
"Sinosteel is a trading organisation, and Tubatse Chrome will be a profit-driven company. If China offers  
the best price we will sell it to China, but we will sell to wherever we can get the best price"  (Reuters, 8 
November 2006).
Moreover,  Samancor has  been criticized as the chrome ore exports to China would impair  the South 
African industry’s prospects. Samancor clarified the criticism by stating that: 
“We are looking to grow an industry, whose profile has remain static for nearly a decade,  while the  
ferrochrome industries of India, Russia, Kazakhstan and China have been expanding. It is true that we  
exported to China, but our long term focus it to add value to the chrome ore we mine in South Africa.”  
(Steelguru, 3 September 2006).
Although China many times have been blamed for its involvement in South Africa, both countries have 
indeed benefited from their trade. Only between 2010 and 2011 South Africa’s exports to China grew at  
115.2% while imports from China grew at 76.7% (Xiaomei, 2012). Moreover, as a result of increased 
trade with China, South Africa’s purchasing power has grown and millions of jobs have been created. For 
instance, Sinosteel’s JVs in Limpopo and Mpumalauga have contributed with additional 3000 local jobs. 
Moreover, at the Bank of China, Huawei Technologies and ZTE Corporation the management has relied 
on South African workers, who account for 70% of the total workforce. The blame towards China has also 
been considered untrue as Chinese companies have helped exhibit South African commodities in China in 
order to enhance trade structures between the two countries, which has proven to be successful (ibid.). 
South Africa’s Foreign Ministry and Peter Draper of South African Institute of International Affairs have 
expressed that they are positive to South Africa’s economic relationship with China. The country has not 
only benefited from growth but also from an increase in prices and exports from South Africa (Cartillier, 
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2007). Moreover, the former South African president Thabo Mbeki believes that  China will  not view 
Africa as a waste ground and repeat its colonial relationships:
“China understands that she can only prosper on a sustainable basis if Africa prospers on a sustainable  
basis” (Cartillier, 5 February 2007)
4.3 Nigeria: China National Offshore Oil Corporation - South Atlantic Petroleum 
The China National Offshore Oil Corporation Limited (CNOOC), including its subsidiaries, is China’s 
biggest producer of offshore natural gas and crude oil. The SOE is also one of the largest operators in the  
oil and gas sector in terms of exploring, developing and producing measured on a global scale (CNOOC 
Ltd,  2013).  In  2006,  CNOOC acquired  45% of  the  shares  in  the  South  Atlantic  Petroleum Limited 
(SAPETRO), a company with an oil mining license (OML) 130 belonging to one of the world’s largest oil  
and gas basins in Nigeria (CNOOC Ltd, 2006). The company CNOOC acquired their stake for $2.27  
billion USD (The Heritage Foundation, 2014). The OML 130 covers an oil and gas field in the Nigerian 
Delta, a deep water block including different areas of oil discoveries that are all run by the global energy  
company Total. Among them, Akpo is the deepwater field involved in the deal, which was said to start its 
operations in 2008 with an estimated capacity of pumping 225.000 barrels per day (bpd), thus implying 
the need for external capital in line with CNOOC’s ability to finance such investment (Wang, 2006). 
The  acquisition  needed  approval  from  both  the  Nigerian  National  Petroleum  Corporation  and  the 
government in China. The CNOOC’s former chairman and CEO Fu Chengyu expressed that:
''The purchase of this interest in OML 130 helps CNOOC gain access to an oil and gas field of huge  
interest and upside potential, located in one of the world's largest oil and gas basins. With one of the  
leading deep water experts as the operator of the field, we have every confidence for the fast and efficient  
production of oil.'' (CNOOC Ltd, 10 January 2006).
Moreover, the deal was a part of CNOOC’s strategy to increase productivity capabilities with the aim to  
raise profits in the long run (CNOOC Ltd, 2009). In addition, the acquisition was believed to contribute to 
diversification in terms of geographic location thus reducing risks. Besides, the deal provided CNOOC 
with an opportunity to acquire expertise from one of Nigeria’s frontrunners in oil production, knowledge 
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which could prove useful in internal operations in the future (CNOOC Ltd, 2006). Nevertheless, taking an 
international point of view, the deal the Chinese signed with SAPETRO was perceived as an overpayment  
thus indicating that the price tag was not the problem in the struggle to overcome oil reserves (Goodman, 
2006). 
In addition, China’s emphasis on finding energy sourcing has been widely criticized as the nation has been 
accused for doing business with regimes. One example of this is the business relation between Sudan and 
China’s National  Petroleum, where the company has been the largest trading partner of oil  in Sudan.  
However, the CNOOC has not been involved in a similar debate as far as we are concerned. Yet, the  
human rights issues in Nigeria have long been about the fact that profits from the oil originate from a 
corrupt  government doing business at  the expense of their  people.  In the deal  with SAPETRO, Xiao 
Zongwei, the CNOOC’s spokesman, stated that such issues would not be involved in the deal. However, 
Zongwei’s description of the deal was more related to the company’s own interest; their source of funding,  
the control CNOOC would acquire over the oil field and the enhanced production capabilities the deal 
would bring, rather than explaining the mutual benefits of it (Goodman, 2006). 
The Sino-Nigerian relationship used to be emphasized by long-term contracts where China was given 
access to oil on the market. However, as a result of China’s strong economic performance the need for oil 
has sought Chinese investors to aim for ownership of the oil reserves rather than just contracting. During  
1999-2007, when Nigeria was run by the president Olusegun Obasanjo,  the trade between China and 
Nigeria was strongly supported by the president’s philosophy of exchanging “oil for infrastructure”, which 
was  based  on the Nigerian  government  selling  blocs  of  oil  in  bidding rounds.  As  a  result,  Beijing’s 
response was an increased interest in Nigerian oil reserves in return for construction and energy projects,  
primarily financed by loans from the Chinese Exim Bank with oil as the security (Mthembu-Salter, 2009). 
However, when Obasanjo’s government was replaced in 2007, the main focus shifted to exchanging oil for 
cash, which has impeded the development of infrastructure severely. The first example of this type of 
investment was Sinopec’s $7.2 billion USD acquisition of Addax in 2009 (Mthembu-Salter, 2009), which 
covered great  oil  reserves in Nigeria.  The deal  clearly indicates  the new shift  in Sino-Nigerian  trade  
relations based on purchasing the assets rather than providing the host country with infrastructure and 
financing, thus implying that oil deals of this size have primarily been focused on offering the highest bid. 
The shift in the Nigerian oil sector has been compared to the Angolan way of doing oil businesses by 
choosing either infrastructure or cash, but not both (ibid.).
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4.4 Angola: Sinopec Limited - Sonangol E.P.
Sinopec,  the former China Petrochemical Corporation, was founded in 1998 and is 100% owned and 
controlled  by  the  Chinese  government.  Sinopec  Group  also  exercise  its  investor  rights  in  the  full  
subsidiaries, controlling companies and companies in which it holds assets (Sinopec Group, 2011). 
In Angola, the exploration of oil has been conducted since 1953 with the purpose to serve the need and  
development of the Angolan people. Sonangol E.P, was established in 1976 and has been a vital source of 
income  for  the  Angolan  government  ever  since,  that  has  entered  the  international  oil  field  by  co-
operations,  JVs  and  sharing  agreements  (Sonangol  EP,  2013).  In  2006  the  two  SOEs,  Sinopec  and 
Sonangol, formed a JV named Sinopec Sonangol International (SSI) which gave Sinopec 75% of the stake 
(Campos & Vines, 2008). Sinopec’s investment in the Angolan oil assets of the official amount of $2.40 
billion USD, included ownership in three different oil blocks; 15 17 and 18, distributed by a stake of 20%, 
27.5% and 40% respectively (ibid.). The acquisition was known to cover oil reserves of 3.2 billion barrels  
that together would contribute to enhanced production capabilities of 100.000 barrels bpd, (China Daily,  
2006), with a total capacity that would then amounting to 240.000 bpd (Macauhub, 2006c). 
Sinopec is Asia’s  largest oil  company measured by refinery capacity,  and therefore sought to enter  a  
partnership with an oil company promising returns of the same size. By establishing a partnership with the 
largest  oil-producing  country  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  next  after  Nigeria,  equipped  by  oil  reserves 
substantial enough to secure an important part of the Chinese market’s need for energy sourcing, the JV 
appeared  as  greatly  beneficial  for  Sinopec  (Macauhub,  2006b).  As  a  result,  the  deal  would  provide 
Sinopec with access to a new network and valuable knowledge about the Angolan way of operating.  
Angola on the other hand, would enjoy a boost in their FDI inflows as the SSI’s winning bid of the oil  
blocks was the world’s highest for a bid of that type. In addition, the deal would provide the country with  
financial support intended for social projects amounting to some $200 million USD and from a business 
point  of  view;  eased  access  to  the  fast-growing  Chinese  market  which  would  promote  GDP growth 
(Campos & Vines, 2008; Macauhub, 2006a). Moreover, as a result of increased bilateral trade between the 
two countries during the time of the investments, the ambassador in Angola stated that China’s largest 
trade partner following South Africa was no other than Angola (Macauhub, 2006b).
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The JV between  Sinopec and Sonangol  has  been  used  as  an  example  of  a  successful  acquisition  in 
different case studies (Global Trade Review, 2007; Macauhub, 2007;), and there are other investments 
strengthening the connection between Sinopec and Sonangol even further.  In fact, the first investment 
occurred already back in 2004 shortly after the first Chinese credit involvement was signed, supported by  
the Exim Bank (Jover et al., 2012). The investment enabled the foundation of China Sonangol, also called 
China International Fund (CIF) (The Economist, 2011), a JV between Sonangol E.P and the New Bright 
International Development company based in Hong Kong (China Songangol, 2012). In 2010, Sinopec 
announced  that  it  was  going  to  purchase  55% of  the  stake  in  SSI  through  an  agreement  with  their 
subsidiary in Hong Kong, which was 100% controlled by Sinopec itself (Sinopec, 2010). The acquisition 
gave Sinopec access to the oil assets that belonged to Block 18, in which SSI held a 50% stake (Sinopec,  
2010). 
Except for governmental financing through Exim Bank, the privately held Hong-kong based CIF has also 
been the channel in which financing has flowed into Angola (Campos & Vines 2008). Thus this has been 
through the JV between Sonangol and the Hong Kong-based company, the latter  also named the” 88 
Queensway Group” or “Queensway Syndicate”, whose originating investments and purposes have been 
widely discussed among analysts and researchers within the field (Levkowitz et al., 2009; The Economist,  
2011). One of the reasons are, for example, that the former chairman and the CEO for Sonangol E.P.,  
Manuel Vicente, has been a very important source for the establishment of the Sino-Angolan relationship 
between both the two governments as well as between Sinopec and Sonangol. According to the Economist 
(2011), Vicente was a partner of the Queensway syndicate runned by Cantonese businessmen, a group 
with high interest in Africa that has been the strongest contributor to one of China’s most crucial trade 
relations. The Queensway syndicate, originating back to the Cold war, has many names but the most well-
known are the CIF or China Sonangol. The investments linked to the Queensway Group appear to be very 
beneficial,  however,  surrounded  by  secrecy.  Therefore,  the  investment  group  has  been  criticized  for 
ignoring poverty and ethical values in their aspiration for wealth. In addition, the Queensway group has  
been accused for being regime-supportive after having signed deals with the regimes in Zimbabwe and 
Guinea.
However, the CIF, or syndicate, has not only been involved in financing of oil investments in Angola but 
also reconstruction projects of infrastructure such as the national railway and the airport in the capital 
Luanda (Jover et al., 2012). In addition, the CIF has contributed to the post-war reconstruction, an office 
called Gabinete de Reconstrução Nacional (GRN) that is linked to the Angolan presidency, a set up made 
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in  2005  with  the  aim  to  handle  larger  investments  of  projects  facilitating  rapid  improvements  of  
infrastructure. Similar to the credit paid by the Chinese Exim Bank, the CIF funding was paid to Chinese 
contractors and distributed among the projects. Nevertheless, the financing through CIF on GRN projects  
came  to  an  end  in  2007,  which  drew media  attention  questioning  the  reason  and  the  Sino-Angolan 
relationship. The CIF had difficulties in raising capital hence resulting in Angolan financing being needed 
to complete the projects of Chinese contractors. Later on in 2007, the CIF was investigated by the Chinese 
Security  Regulatory  Commission  after  being  accused  for  attempts  to  influence  the  stock  price  in 
investments linked to Angola (Campos & Vines, 2008).
In general,  the Sino-Angolan relationship has been a target for both discussion and speculation. Both 
parties  seem to regard their  partnership as  strategic  and mutually  beneficial,  which the President  dos 
Santos confirmed in 2006 during the visit of China’s prime minister; 
“China needs natural resources and Angola wants development” (Campos & Vines, 2008:18). 
According to the Angolan point of view, one motive was the funding from China with beneficial terms and 
conditions and lower interest rates compared to Western financing, thus helping Angola to strategically  
build up their infrastructure. In addition, other sources of financing than Chinese required higher securities  
and interest rates on the same hand as Angola’s relation to both the IMF and the World Bank was critical. 
On the other hand, China needed sourcing for their increased energy needs as a result of strong economic  
performance  over  the  last  two  decades  hence  increasing  oil  consumption.  In  addition,  the  Angolan 
construction industry with low competition emerged as very attractive for Chinese entrepreneurs. As a 
result of increased investments and collaboration, the government in Angola has benefited by for example 
economic development, improved trade relations, cheaper technology transfer, scholarship opportunities 
and better education and health solutions (Campos & Vines, 2008).
Nevertheless, there are other aspects that should be taken into account, indicating that the motives behind 
this acquisition and other related deals have contributed to the development of less beneficial outcomes 
that will be further discussed in the analysis chapter. For example, the economic cooperation raises new 
challenges for Angola that might have long-term impacts. In 2007 Sinopec and Sonangol were supposed 
to enter a refinery project together in Lobito with a production capacity of more than 200.000 bpd, in 
which Sinopec received very beneficial terms. But still, the two parts could not agree on what market to 
target. At the same time, a press conference was held where the CEO of Sonangol stated that: 
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“We have reached a point where we cannot make concessions, we cannot build a refinery to produce for  
the Chinese market” (Alves, 2010:19).
The technology involved in the agreement could not be used for both the Asian and Western market, thus  
leading to a choice between them where China preferred to supply their market whereas Angola wanted to  
provide its domestic, regional and the Western market with oil (Alves, 2010). Another example of such 
disagreement is Sinopec’s involvement in a severe legal dispute with the government in Gabon after their 
acquisition of Addax. As a result of violation against the laws in Gabon, Sinopec’s actions almost made  
them losing their oil mining license in the country (Farge, 2013).
4.3 Summary of Empirical Findings 
In summary, South Africa, Nigeria and Angola all started off as colonies occupied by the West and are  
countries  rich in natural  resources.  However they differ  in terms of historical  background as  well  as  
political  and macroeconomic  stability.  Among the three countries,  South Africa stands out  as  a well-
developed economy that enjoys a business friendly environment, attracting a high level of FDI inflows 
into the continent. In a short period of time Nigeria has flourished and become a country with high growth  
potential where a major part of the revenues are generated from their great oil and natural gas reserves.  
Angola has been, and still is, an important supplier of oil, although their economy is not as diversified as 
for example South Africa or Nigeria since it is highly dependent on their oil reserves. 
The characteristics of each country have been highlighted in our case studies which all  involve large  
Chinese SOEs investing with relatively high shares in African companies in the metal and energy sector.  
Although the motives behind each investment have been quite similar for the Chinese SOEs, they differ in 
terms  of  entry  modes.  The  outcomes  of  the  investment  have  resulted  in  job  opportunities,  greater  
production capacities, as well as improved infrastructure and education. Nevertheless, the findings in this 
chapter have also shed light over questions regarding the real underlying motives behind the investments 
in the studied African firms and long-term effects on sustainability and economic development.
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5. ANALYSIS
The following chapter will cover an analysis and discussion of our findings in our three case studies,  
which will  be  compared with our  theoretical  framework in order  to  provide answers  to our  research 
question; 
What  are  the  motives  behind  Chinese  OFDI  into  African  firms  and  how  do  they  affect  economic  
development in receiving host countries in the long-term?
Since the research question is composed by two elements, we will divide this chapter into two sections by 
first discussing the motives followed by the consequences of Chinese OFDI in African firms. 
5.1 Motives behind Chinese OFDI in African Firms 
In the first case we studied in South Africa, Sinosteel formed a JV with Samancor where the motive was to 
exploit  chrome  resources  in  South  Africa  in  order  to  provide  the  Chinese  company  with  necessary 
resources to fuel its rapid economic growth. Samancor appeared as a strategically important partner as it  
currently owns 70% of the total ferrochrome ore resources in South Africa and the JV would own chrome 
resources seven times bigger than the total chrome resources in China. Also, Sinosteel located smelters 
near  mines  in  South  Africa  in  order  to  improve  the  quality  of  their  products  before  reaching  the  
international  market.  These  motives  go  in  line  with  the  resource-seeking  and  the  efficiency-seeking 
motives  described in  Dunning’s OLI-model  (2000).  These motives  could also be found in Rugman’s 
FSA/CSA matrix reconciled with the eclectic paradigm (1981, 2010) where home country characteristics  
are  also taken into account.  The resource-seeking motive and the efficiency-seeking motive could be  
found in the first cell in his model where the home country, China, lacks in FSAs and the host country,  
South Africa, has high CSAs. One could also argue that the investment was targeted to South Africa as a  
result of its location advantages such as its strategic location as a gateway to the continent but also the  
country’s fair government policies and healthy diplomatic relations between China and South Africa. This 
could be found under the political advantages in the location variable in Dunning’s OLI-model (Dunning, 
1980, l988).
48
In the second case in Nigeria, the benefits of the deal were only described from a Chinese perspective 
rather  than  from  both  perspectives  as  a  “win-win  project”.  First  of  all,  the  deal  was  signed  as  an  
acquisition rather than an establishment of a partnership such as a JV, as in the case with Sinosteel and 
Samancor. This indicates that the most crucial point was to own the assets and not to mutually benefit  
from each other. Therefore, the importance of gaining access to a great oil field through the OML 130,  
belonging  to  one  of  the  largest  oil  basins  with  huge  upscale  potential,  was  emphasized  as  the  most  
important driver. This implies a resource-seeking investment found in Dunning’s OLI-model (2000) and 
Rugman’s matrix FSA/CSA (1981, 2010) reconciled with the eclectic paradigm. This asset exploiting  
strategy could also be explained by the ownership specific advantages in Dunning's OLI-model (1980, 
1988) as CNOOC was able to engage in OFDI and acquire oil reserves as a result of being a capital 
intensive company. In addition, the deal was told to increase development opportunities and production 
capacities in the long run, which further stresses the linkage to the efficiency-seeking motive in Dunning’s 
OLI-model (2000) and Rugman’s FSA/CSA matrix reconciled with the eclectic paradigm (1981, 2010). 
From China’s point of view, the terms and conditions of the deal appeared as very attractive in comparison 
to other global upstream deals of the same size and in the same time, which could imply that SAPETRO 
saw CNOOC’s high bid as the primary motive for signing the deal perhaps due to their need to secure  
capital.
In the third case, we would claim that Sinopec’s JV with Sonangol is another example of a resource-driven 
investment explained by Dunning’s four motives for FDI (2000). In this case, it appears very obvious  
since oil reserves are Angola’s most important source of income, where the exports of oil are as high as  
98%. Moreover China’s share of oil  imports from Angola account for 40%, which could explain the  
determinants of Sinopec’s engagement in Sonangol. This is also confirmed when relating to Rugman’s 
FSA/CSA matrix reconciled with the eclectic paradigm (1981, 2010) where the host country Angola has  
an abundance of natural resources, thus a very high level of CSAs, compared to China hence being the key 
driver behind the investment. 
In the JV called SSI, Sinopec immediately obtained the dominating stake of 75% and only four years later,  
Sinopec acquired a 55% stake of SSI. One could speculate whether this confirms that Sinopec had a rather  
unknown, long-term strategy with their investment, which perhaps was to preferably acquire the assets by 
owning rather than developing the JV together with Sonangol. This FDI strategy could be explained by 
Dunning’s  (1980,  1988,  2010)  ownership  specific  advantages  in  the  OLI-model,  where  Sinopec’s 
dominant position at the home market and capital strength enabled them to exploit their advantages and  
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engage in FDI to gain access to oil. Except for providing Sinopec with access to their most important 
resource, the deal would contribute to gained knowledge within the field but also improved efficiency in  
terms  of  reduced  operating  costs,  thus  implying  some  signs  of  an  efficiency-seeking  investment, 
developed by Dunning (2000). 
However, taking the motive behind this deal and the fact that Angola is extremely dependent on one 
source of income into consideration, one could argue that morality behind this investment should have 
been paid a greater deal of attention rather than just focusing on a business transaction of a high amount.  
As the Angolan economy is highly dependent on one precious resource and its global pricing, one could 
wonder whether the “beneficial” Chinese financing and support of infrastructure projects really outweigh 
the risks of being too dependent on a trading partner of that size. This is clearly evident as the real motives  
and long-term strategic plans might be more hidden than the ability to understand the origins and network 
of the “88 Queensway Group”, whom in many cases appears to be the real investor. One example of a 
strategy of that kind, is the refinery investment Sinopec and Sonangol was suppose to develop in Lobito,  
which ended up in a disagreement since Sinopec revealed that their aim with the refinery was to only 
produce for the Chinese market whereas Sonangol had another request.
Disagreements of this kind might impede the LLL-model suggested by Mathews (2006) to be successfully 
implemented. Both Sinosteel and Sinopec entered the African market through a JV, which implies less risk 
and greater opportunity for learning synergies to occur. However, in contrast to Sinosteel, Sinopec made  
an acquisition to gain access over 55% of the oil reserves in SSI shortly after having established a JV with  
the dominant stake of 75%. Moreover, Sinopec had a completely different prioritization in their project 
with Sonangol, which could imply that  the learning stage in the LLL-process never occurs if the co-
operation between the parties is not successful. Nevertheless, the Sinopec-Sonangol case has been used as 
an example of one of the best deals in 2006, which should indicate that the synergies should have been  
rather successful. Yet, these potential synergies remain unknown since this information has not been able  
to access in our study. However, one could argue that the synergies of the LLL-model were not as obvious 
as in the Sinosteel deal, where both parties seemed to mutually benefit from the co-operation through their  
JV. 
On the other hand, CNOOC’s expansion to Nigeria was formed by an acquisition directly, which is often 
related to higher risk when entering a new market, as a company from an emerging economy might lack 
both links and experiences from a global expansion. Thus it should be considered less difficult to leverage 
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the links through the investment by forming a JV. In this case, no evidence has been found on how or if  
the learning process occurred after the acquisition. What could explain the choice of entry mode in the 
Nigerian  market,  though,  is  the  change  in  preferring  ownership  rather  than  contracting  as  a  way  of  
securing energy sourcing. 
5.2 Consequences of Chinese OFDI in African Firms 
As earlier mentioned, we consider that the LLL-model developed by Mathews (2006) focuses on a home 
country perspective. Since we analyze the implications of Chinese OFDI in African firms mainly from an  
African standpoint and a host country perspective, our aim is to apply the LLL-model and try to provide 
an explanation of the consequences of Chinese OFDI in African firms as we believe that the consequences 
are somewhat related to the motives. 
As  previously  discussed,  the  deal  between  Sinosteel  and  Samancor  was  a  win-win  project  as  both 
mutually benefited from the deal. Whereas Sinosteel benefited from gaining natural resources through a  
JV with a reliable supplier and a key player in the South African chrome ore industry, South Africa was  
provided with technology, management, marketing and fundraising as well  as long-term access to the 
Chinese market. Among the cases we studied we argue this was the most successful. When applying these  
findings  on  Mathews’ LLL-model  (2006),  traditionally  describing  the  synergies  that  occur  when  an 
emerging  country  invests  in  Western  countries,  China  could  in  this  case  be  viewed  as  the  advanced 
country,  almost  equivalent  to  a  Western  country  whereas  South  Africa  rather  resembles  an  emerging 
market as China. This is clearly shown especially if relating to what the deal provided each of the two  
countries,  where  skills  enhancing  the  learning  process  as  technology,  management  and  marketing 
normally are streaming from the West to an emerging market such as China. 
It is evident that Sinosteel’s presence in South Africa has had positive outcomes, creating job opportunities 
in the local community, boosting education and hospitals, thus being compliant with social and economic 
development. We would reason that using the local workforce implies that Sinosteel wanted to adopt to the 
South African company and preserve the way things  were done.  We believe that  these factors  could 
influence a successful learning process consistent with Mathews’ LLL-model (2006), where both parties 
benefit from an enhanced network, building a bridge between the countries. However, it has been argued 
that the underlying motive was business-driven and one could question whether China’s intention was to 
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ensure energy supplies at a fair price or contribute to economic development. One could argue that a vast  
flow of minerals to boost the steel industry in China might hamper South African chrome ore industry and 
its economic development in the long-term.
In the case of CNOOC and SAPETRO, the outcome of the deal was dependent on the institutions and 
policies of the two parties involved. The Chinese way of investing and preferably own natural resources in 
Africa seems to be characterized by high bids. These bids are almost regarded as overpayments globally,  
which have resulted in a great inflow of capital into Nigeria as a tool to promote economic growth and  
development of other sectors. However, the success in achieving economic development is dependent on 
institutional factors and how the Nigerian government chooses to reinvest the money. As a result of the  
shift  from  President  Obasanjo’s  philosophy  of  trading  “oil  for  infrastructure”,  the  development  of 
construction and energy projects slowed down in exchange for a higher inflow of cash. One could argue 
that this shift from infrastructure to cash would have a negative impact on a greater part of the Nigerian  
people  since  improvements  in  infrastructure  and  other  projects  in  society  are  tangible  effects  of  
investments. These investments are beneficial for the people as a whole and not only the government,  
whereas inflow of capital might stay within the governmental elite. Nevertheless, the implementation of 
EITI with the aim to increase transparency and governance in the oil industry should have a positive effect 
on these issues ensuring that oil businesses must be handled correctly. 
In  our  study,  little  evidence  has  been  found  on  the  implications  CNOOC’s  investment  has  had  on 
economic growth in Nigeria since the overall focus has been on the benefits the deal would contribute to 
CNOOC. However, it is fair to say that the increased inflow of FDI as a result of investments emphasized 
by  higher  ownership  interest  and  bidding  offers,  would  especially  strengthen  SAPETRO’s  economic 
performance since a capital-intensive owner often allows for continued investments within the firm. For 
example, the acquisition of the deepwater field Akpo was said to enhance production capabilities up to 
225.000 bpd after 2008, an increase which should indicate a higher level of oil exports from Nigeria.  
Taking the purpose with the LLL-model (Mathews, 2006) into account,  it  is  fair  to say that  it  is the 
purpose of the investment that basically determines whether successful leverage of the links results in 
learning  or  not.  Therefore,  one  could  question if  CNOOC’s  desire  to  gain  access  to  oil  reserves  by 
ownership offsets the potential learning synergies that most likely occur if the two parties enter a JV and 
aim to operate by co-operation, mutual investments and management structure. 
The effects  Sinopec’s  deal  has  had on Angola  has  been primarily  linked to oil-backed financing and  
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infrastructure projects but also reconstruction improvements after the civil-war that ended as late as in 
2002. The co-operation agreements between Sinopec and Sonangol have covered both development of 
existing reserves thus increasing productivity and the need for additional workers, but also exploration of  
oil reserves and new investments. As a result of the collaboration, joint exploration and investments this 
could indicate a successful learning phase according to Mathews’ LLL-model (2006) where experiences  
and knowledge from the industry could mutually benefit both Sinopec and Sonangol. This has contributed 
to  economic  growth  and  increased  bilateral  trade  for  Angola,  mostly  as  a  result  of  Sinopec’s  and 
Sonangol’s oil relationship. However, one could claim that this relation between the two parts is purely  
governmental, which implies that the success of Angola’s economic development lies in the hands of its  
institutional pattern rather than its local people, thus hampering the purpose of the LLL-model (Mathews, 
2006). As an example, Thomas L. Friedman suggests in his “First Law of Petropolitics”, that the price of 
oil and the pace of freedom tend to move in opposite directions (Friedman, 2006). Therefore, one could  
state that there might be a trade-off for Angola between China’s support in infrastructure and beneficial  
loans, and transparency in society and in the political  system as well  as improvements of corruption,  
which indicates that there is a need for Angola to implement EITI as well. 
Nevertheless,  China’s  beneficiary  treatment  could  also  be  a  factor  impeding the  long-term economic 
development in Angola.  As Angola’s  economy is highly dependent  on China and their trade relation,  
where more than 40% of their oil exports are directed to China, the country is vulnerable for changes that  
could occur in the future. However, the disagreement in the joint investment of the new refinery in Lobito  
changed the relationship between Sinopec and Sonangol to become increasingly strict (Alves, 2010). As a  
result, analysts studying the relationship between the two parties have expressed Angola’s ambition to 
diversify its trade pattern to not only being dominated by China. Applying Mathews’ LLL-model (2006) 
on the above discussion, one could reason that in the case of Angola the focus should be on developing the 
links and the leverage rather than the learning process. Since Angola has not attempted to fully diversify  
its trade relations until recently, the global linkages need to be strengthen by expanding their network on a 
global  scale.  As  a  part  of  their  global  linkages  strategy,  this  should  facilitate  enhanced  leverage 
possibilities in the future. According to Campos and Vines (2008), the President of Angola, dos Santos,  
claimed in 2008 that the nation, as a result of globalization, naturally sought to broaden its economic 
relations internationally. Consequently, it has been discussed whether Sinopec ought to add value in other  
forms than primarily financing and providing infrastructure with the aim to strengthen its relation with  
Sonangol (Alves, 2010).
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5.3 Discussion
We believe that the success factor of the deals much could be explained by the characteristics of each 
country. With a well established political environment and macroeconomic stability, it is no wonder that  
South Africa has become a leading recipient of FDI in Africa. Thus the mutual benefits of the Sinosteel-
Samancor  deal  could  partly  be  explained  by  healthy  diplomatic  recognition  as  well  as  relationships  
emphasized by development between China and South Africa. These aspects are included in the location 
specific advantages in Dunning’s OLI-model (1980, 1988). Furthermore, as South Africa is the easiest  
country in terms of conducting business in sub-Saharan Africa, we can assume that the trend regarding 
Chinese investments in South Africa will last in the foreseeable future. In the Nigeria and Angola cases it 
is evident that China was the primary country benefiting from the relationship by satisfying their self  
interests. Although Nigeria is projected to be one of the most promising emerging economies in the near 
future, the country still face issues such as corruption, poor infrastructure and power supplies. These are 
also challenges that are more apparent in Angola. Both Nigeria and Angola are also highly dependent on 
specific  natural  resources  rather  than  on  diversified  industries,  especially  Angola  where  oil  is  their 
dominating source of income. Whereas MNEs keep location advantages in mind (Dunning, 1980, 1988)  
when engaging in the foreign market, one could speculate whether Sinopec took advantage of locational  
disadvantages such as poor regimes and under-development in Angola. Therefore, we believe that the 
benefits  to get  hold of natural  resources of such importance outweighed the risks associated with an  
investments in a country with these characteristics. 
Taking the above discussion  of  Chinese investments  in African firms into account,  we would like to 
emphasize and discuss the fact that the outcomes might have differed depending on the type of enterprises 
studied. In our cases the Chinese enterprises were all SOEs, thus the distinction between the SOE and  
privately owned enterprise (POE) might have had an impact on the motives and the objectives behind each 
deal.  First  of  all,  whereas  private  investments  usually  are  targeted  towards  sectors  in  agriculture,  
manufacturing  and  communications,  public  investments  are  often  directed  towards  natural  resources, 
infrastructure and transport (Egbula & Zheng, 2011). Secondly, as there is a grey zone between business 
and politics such as in the example of the “88 Queensway Syndicate”, it is not always clear who the real  
investor is and what their motives are. Thirdly, SOEs might ignore the prospects of their own citizens and 
hamper economic growth and competition. As we have seen in the cases, especially regarding Nigeria and 
Angola, it is particularly the powerful elite that benefits from controlling natural resources rather than the  
citizens, which could pose the question on how much is reinvested in the economy (SARW, 2012). One 
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could argue that if a POE was to invest in the sectors we have analyzed, they might have paid more  
attention to local laws concerning labor rights and the environment as their goal is to maximize profits and 
maintain transparency in order to add value for stakeholder and shareholders. Conversely, the opposite  
seems to be true in some cases  of SOEs,  for example in  Sinopec’s acquisition of  Addax,  where the  
company violated local laws in Gabon resulting in disputes and the risk of Addax losing their license.
Finally,  we  would  like  to  highlight  our  reasoning  that  since  each  case  involved the  search  for  non-
renewable resources it could be questioned if long-term aspects of sustainability were taken into account  
in the Chinese investments. There was no evidence that the intention of the Chinese investments were to 
exploit resources and then leave the countries. Instead we perceived that the investments were undertaken 
on a long-term. Therefore we question if the investments really are lasting and sustainable as these kinds  
of resources are limited. Besides, as the strong growth in the Chinese economy is said to stagnate (The  
Economist, 2013b), this could have severe implications on economic development on a too dependent 
Africa, especially on countries like Angola. Therefore, Africa as a whole needs to be determinant with  
their strategy when engaging in global trade relations to ensure a continued development of their economy 
in the long-term, as many observers have pointed out that  “China has a clear strategy for Africa, but  
Africa has no strategy for China” (SARW, 2012).
After having analyzed the motives and consequences of Chinese FDI engagement in Africa we would 
claim that although China in earlier research has been accused for exploiting natural resources in Africa 
due to self-interests, it is a somewhat unjustified accusation. Despite the fact that China has benefited from 
a greater access to natural resources, it is evident that Chinese investments have promoted growth and 
economic development in African countries. Accordingly, we would claim that the responsibility also lies  
in the hands of the governments in South Africa, Nigeria and Angola and how they choose to develop the 
growth potential offered by its investors in order to achieve a win-win situation where not only China  
benefits but also Africa. Besides, Africa needs to reconsider their global strategy and overhaul the reasons  
hampering their economic growth, such as their political and institutional systems (SARW, 2012).
5.4 Summary of Analysis 
After having compiled the results from our three case studies, we could see a major tendency towards 
resource-seeking  motives  behind  the  Chinese  investments  in  South  Africa,  Nigeria  and  Angola.  As  
55
discerned from Dunning’s OLI-model (1980, 1988, 2000) and Rugman’s FSA/CSA matrix (1981, 2010), 
resource-seeking investments are often a result of low levels of natural resources in the home country,  
which would motivate investments in a market overseas where there is an abundance of natural resources.  
This is  clearly evident  for China as well  as for the investing companies in our cases  whose national  
reserves  of  natural  resources  are  relatively  scarce.  We  could  also  see  investments  associated  with 
efficiency-seeking motives enhancing Chinese operational activities such as increased productivity and 
value-adding processes for Chinese production. 
The  consequences  of  Chinese  investments  have  had  positive  outcomes,  creating  jobs,  improving 
infrastructure, hospitals and schools as well as increasing production to mention some. In the case with 
Sinosteel and Samancor, both mutually benefited from the deal which formed a JV. Despite the increased  
inflow of  FDI  and  enhanced  production,  the  CNOOC’s  investment  in  SAPETRO indicated  that  the 
purpose was to acquire the assets rather than co-operate through a JV, which might have impeded the  
emergence of the learning phase in the LLL-model (Mathews, 2006). In Sinopec’s JV with Sonangol, they 
mutually developed and explored oil reserves where the collaboration led to shared knowledge in line with 
Mathews’ level  of  learning  in  the  LLL-model  (2006).  However,  four  years  later  Sinopec  made  an  
acquisition of the JV, holding the dominant stake which could have had implications on the synergies of  
the LLL-model.  In addition,  even though Sinopec’s investments increased the bilateral  trade between 
China and Angola, Angola’s dependency on China might increase risks and hamper economic growth. 
This further facilitates the perception that the main challenges for Angola as a country are to develop their  
global linkages by diversifying its trade relations in order to achieve the phases of leverage and learning in  
accordance  to  the  LLL-model  (Mathews,  2006).  Finally,  as  the  Chinese  investments  involved  non-
renewable resources it could be questioned if these investments really are sustainable in the long-term thus 
emphasizing the need for a diversified economy as well. 
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6. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this thesis has been to analyze China’s motives behind OFDI in African firms and the 
subsequent consequences considering the long-term impact on economic development in the receiving 
host  countries  in  Africa.  Our  aim has  therefore  been to  investigate  Chinese OFDI  from a firm-level 
perspective by analyzing a number of selected case studies that illustrate Chinese investments in African 
firms  and apply  these  on  our  theoretical  framework.  The  empirical  findings  were  based  on  Chinese 
investments in three countries; South Africa (Sinosteel - Samancor), Nigeria (CNOOC - SAPETRO) and 
Angola (Sinopec - Sonangol), of which all Chinese MNEs were SOEs. Our ambition has been to hopefully 
contribute to new findings and results within this field, which could prove useful in future research. The 
motives  behind  Chinese  ownerships  in  African  firms  have  mainly  been  analyzed  from  a  Chinese 
perspective whereas the consequences in the receiving host countries in South Africa, Nigeria and Angola 
have been viewed mainly from an African standpoint.
6.1 Answers to Research Question
In order to fulfill our aim of this thesis we will now provide answers to our research question, which was  
formulated as followed; 
What  are  the  motives  behind  Chinese  OFDI  into  African  firms  and  how  do  they  affect  economic  
development in receiving host countries in the long term?
Chinese MNEs invest in African firms primarily for resource-seeking motives. 
After  having compiled our empirical  observations  we could see a  tendency towards resource-seeking 
motives explained by Dunning’s four motives in the OLI-model (2000) in the cases we studied in South 
Africa, Nigeria and Angola. The motives in each case were driven by strategic considerations with China’s 
aim  to  secure  natural  resources  supplies  in  the  mining  and  oil  sector  to  fuel  its  rapid  economic  
development on the domestic market.
In the long term, Chinese OFDI promotes economic development by offering beneficial funding, 
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improved  infrastructure,  job  opportunities  and  social  projects  in  the  country  receiving  the 
investment. Yet, due to political and institutional factors and a change in the Chinese investment 
pattern, this statement does not always holds true. Instead, some economies are too dependent on 
specific  resources  and  some  investment  relations  are  based  on  governmental  contact  only  thus 
increasing risks and hampering potential economic development for the country and its people.
For the greater part, the receiving host countries benefited from the Chinese investments. In addition, all  
three cases have indicated that great improvements in infrastructure and reconstruction projects have been 
a major factor affecting economic growth. Moreover, the deals have contributed to enhanced production 
capacities within the enterprise thus resulting in increased export capabilities and bilateral trade. What our 
study also showed, was that the investment pattern from Chinese SOEs has changed over the past years 
implying a greater importance of ownership-interests rather than long-term contracting, which has led to  
record high bids and higher inflow of capital as a result. Besides, due to country specific characteristics  
and  an  economy  that  is  very  dependent  on  one  type  of  resource  or  one  trading  partner,  this  have 
implications on economic development and sustainability in the future. In turn, this might hamper the  
emergence of linkage, leverage and learning processes described by the LLL-model (Mathews, 2006). 
Except for the importance of diversifying an economy, this also stressed the significance of investments  
that  are sustainable in the long-term. Therefore,  the African countries receiving the FDI inflows,  and  
especially Angola, need to reconsider their global strategy in order to ensure economic development. 
6.2 Theoretical Contributions
Our findings prove that the eclectic paradigm (e.g. Dunning, 1977, 1980, 1988, 2000) itself  does not 
succeed to fully explain the results of our research. As previously discussed, over the past decades the 
dynamics  of  the  global  economy and the widespread  globalization  have  resulted  in  modifications  in 
existing FDI theories. The pattern for investment flows has changed, not only originating from developed  
countries but from developing and emerging countries as well, making the OLI-model that dates back to  
1977 somewhat insufficient to capture the motives behinds FDIs. Therefore we have, besides the OLI-
model,  utilized  complementary  contributions  from  Rugman’s  FSA/CSA  matrix  (1981,  2010)  and 
Mathews’ LLL-model  (2006)  in  order  to  critically  judge  and  provide  a  deeper  understanding  when 
analyzing our results. The eclectic paradigm reconciled with Rugman’s FSA/CSA matrix (1981, 2010) 
have primarily served as a foundation to explain the motives behind Chinese OFDI in Africa, as home 
58
country and host country aspects are considered simultaneously. 
Secondly,  when analyzing the long-term implications of Chinese investments in the receiving African 
countries we have utilized Mathews LLL-model (2006) as our dominating framework. We argue that the 
LLL-model to some extent could describe the synergies and the learning that occur when using the model 
from the reversed perspective, i.e. the host country, where the African firms leverage the links that emerge. 
However, we hold on to our previous assertion that the LLL-model better  serves to explain its primary 
purpose: the process of FDI engagement from the investing firm’s perspective where the linkage, leverage 
and  learning  process  is  targeted  primarily  towards  developed  countries  rather  than  developing  and 
emerging countries. In addition, we claim that the synergies deriving from the links, leverage and learning 
phases in Mathews’ LLL-model (2006) should appear more clear if applying the model on a period of time 
including several events rather than focusing on a specific case study of a company. 
6.3 Suggestions for Future Research 
In this thesis we conducted case studies of Chinese SOEs investing in African firms in South Africa,  
Nigeria and Angola analyzed on a micro-level. As we only analyzed three cases, we would suggest to 
conduct additional case studies in future research in order to draw conclusions based on a broader range  
and increase the reliability. As previously discussed, it would also be interesting to investigate whether and 
how the motives and the outcomes of investments by POEs would differ from SOEs as the ones we 
studied in this thesis. 
Secondly, when analyzing the empirical findings we found that the theories utilized did not fully explain  
the Chinese investment patterns in Africa in our cases. The LLL-model suggested by Mathews (2006) 
does indeed complement Dunning’s eclectic paradigm (1980, 1988, 2000), however we found that this  
model  was  more  applicable  to  emerging  countries  investing  in  developed  countries  rather  than  less 
developed countries such as the countries in Africa. Thus the LLL-model describes the process of linkage,  
leverage and learning mainly from the investor’s perspective, in this case China. As far as we know, there 
are no such models that describe how the host country could leverage the links achieved by its global  
investors  into the country.  Therefore  we  would suggest  an extension of  the LLL-model  covering the 
process of integration for the host country receiving the FDI or develop a reversed model to apprehend the 
perspectives from the host country, which was done in this case. As the dynamics of the global economy 
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has led to yet another shift where the pattern of OFDIs tend to target developing countries with poor 
institutions  not  sufficiently  equipped  to  face  the  vast  amount  of  investments,  the  need  for  a  model  
explaining the emergence is urgent. We believe that in order to fully understand and leverage the global 
links this would also provide African economies with a tool to strategically overcome the risk for neo-
colonialism to occur but also to strengthen its presence and competitiveness in the global economy.
Finally, in this thesis we did not come across implications on a managerial level, data which we initially  
had an ambition to find. Thus we would suggest for future researchers to conduct a study based on a 
manager’s perspective and perhaps implications on employees in the firm receiving the investment in the 
host  country.  Rather than focusing on the general  pattern,  one could possibly analyze FDI and MNE 
activity from an organizational perspective and thus use organizational  paradigms in order to explain 
managerial behavior when exploiting scarce resources overseas (Buckley, 1996).
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